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I. INTRODUCTION 
The advantages of arbitration are well-known. Arbitration "'is usually 
cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and 
evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of 
ongoing and future business dealings among the parties .... '" Arbitra-
tion also helps to relieve crowded court dockets. 1 
299 
There is an irony in the above statement: it was taken from a case 
wherein the parties went through two arbitrations, a case in a Texas federal 
district court, a case in a New York district court, and a case in the New 
York Supreme Court, and finally, an appeal to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. This tortuous path was hardly "cheaper," and it certainly did not 
"relieve crowded court dockets." Although this case was unusually liti-
gious, virtually all the cases discussed in this article involved attempted 
arbitrations, subsequent appeals, and in some cases, a hearing in the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act gives a very limited number 
of statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award: 
§ 10. SAME; VACATION; GROUNDS; REHEARING 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the 
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(I) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means. 
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them. 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
( 4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not made. 
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agree-
ment required the award to be made has not expired the court may, 
in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 
(b) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was 
made that was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an or-
der vacating the award upon the application of a person, other than a 
party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the 
I. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 
133 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) 
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award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with 
the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.2 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court created the non-statutory 
ground allowing the vacating of an award for "manifest disregard of the 
law." 
When one reads the annotations under Section 10 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act it would seem rather clear that a large number of parties who 
contracted for arbitration in their contracts had no adequate knowledge of 
the awesome finality of most arbitration awards; it is submitted that any 
lawyer who advises his/her clients to sign arbitration contracts without ad-
equately advising them of the considerable finality of arbitration awards is 
guilty of malpractice. In addition, it is submitted that lawyers should ad-
vise their clients of the sometimes huge costs which they may incur in arbi-
tration proceedings. Fortunately, it would appear that in most labor arbitra-
tions the employer agrees to defray the costs of arbitration; this is not true 
in commercial arbitration cases. 3 
II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARDS 
A. Article V of the Convention of and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards Cannot Be Supplemented by Implied Reasons Such as "Manifest 
Disregard of the Law" for Vacating an Award. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was recently presented with an 
arbitration award case involving the large American corporation of Toys 
"R" Us which had granted a limited license to a Kuwaiti business to open 
Toys "R" Us stores in Kuwait and 13 other Middle Eastern countries.4 The 
Kuwaiti franchisee opened four stores in Kuwait, but in no other country. 
After the Gulf War, the parties entered into negotiations to alter their ar-
rangement; these negotiations failed and Toys "R" Us attempted to termi-
nate the contract. 
Toys "R" Us then contracted with another company to open stores in 
Kuwait and four other countries included in the contract with the first li-
censee. Toys "R" Us then initiated arbitration proceedings before the 
American Arbitration Association in New York. 
The single arbitrator awarded the Kuwaiti licensee $46.44 million for 
lost profits, plus 9 per cent interest dating from the date of the termination 
of the contract by Toys "R" Us. The Kuwait licensee then sought to en-
2. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
3. See the penetrating discussion by Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards in Cole v. Bums Int'l 
Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
4. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
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force the award in the Federal District Court in New York. Toys "R" Us 
cross-moved in the court to vacate the award under the provisions of the 
Federal Arbitration Act's implied grounds. 
Toys "R" Us asserted that the award in favor of the licensee "was 
clearly irrational in manifest disregard of the law, and in manifest disre-
gard of the terms of the agreement,"5 which are terms implied by the 
American courts as part of the Federal Arbitration Act. 
The district court agreed with Toys "R" Us's position that both the 
terms of the provisions for vacating or refusing to enforce an arbitration 
award under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards and the Federal Arbitration Act govern the disposi-
tion of this award, which was made in the United States. In accord with 
scant prior authority, the court held that the "manifest disregard defense is 
not available under Article V of the Convention or otherwise to a party ... 
seeking to vacate an award of foreign arbitrators based upon foreign law."6 
Toys "R" Us appealed to the court of appeals which noted that this 
award was between two non-domesticated companies and one United 
States corporation, and "it principally involved conduct and contract per-
formance in the Middle East."7 It was not a domestic award and it was sub-
ject to the Recognition Convention. In accord with meager prior authority, 8 
the court held that Article V of the Convention on Recognition of and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral A wards which articulates the reasons for 
vacating a foreign award were the exclusive reasons and they could not be 
supplemented by implied reasons, such as "manifest disregard of the law." 
Then the court quoted Article V(l )(e) of the Convention which state that 
enforcement may also be refused if "[t]he award has not yet become bind-
ing on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent au-
thority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was 
made. 9 
The Court reasoned that the italicized words in Article V(l )(e) that a 
suit brought to vacate an award is governed by the domestic law of the ren-
dering state; hence the case law in the United States sanctioning the use of 
"manifest disregard notion" is part of that law and it can be used to attack 
the award in this case. Under the court's approach, although the court re-
fused to apply the Federal Arbitration Act (and its case law offspring) di-
rectly to the facts, it allowed the case law to apply indirectly through the 
Convention. 
5. !d. at 18. 
6. !d. at 20. 
7. !d. at 19. 
8. !d. at 18. 
9. !d. at 21 (emphasis added). 
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The court then borrowed a definition of "manifest disregard of the 
law" from another case. "The error must have been obvious and capable of 
being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to 
serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbi-
trator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but 
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."10 
Under this definition, the court held that the arbitrator did not disre-
gard the law of New York regarding the computation of damages and he 
did not "manifestly disregard the contractual agreement between the par-
ties" even though the court stated: "[ w ]e will not overturn the arbitrator's 
award merely because we do not concur with the arbitrator's reading of the 
agreement." 11 
The court then affirmed the district court's decision. 
It is submitted that the court reached the proper results in upholding 
the arbitration award, but that the use of the "manifest disregard" notion in 
international arbitration when the arbitration takes place in the United 
States will be counterproductive in a number of ways: 
I. This "wild-card" award-attacking device will result in increased 
costs, delay in resolution of disputes, and uncertainty in the finality of 
awards. 
2. Knowledgeable lawyers will insert arbitration clauses which avoid 
arbitration in the United States on international commercial contracts. 
3. In the drafting of arbitration forum selection clauses, lawyers will 
have to be sure that the forum state's law does not follow the approach 
of this case. 
4. It has been pointed out elsewhere that this utilization of a non-statu-
tory ground such as "manifest disregard of the law" encourages the case-
law adoption of other non-statutory reasons to vacate arbitration 
awards. 12 
10. /d. at 24 quoting Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 
(2nd Cir. 1986) 
11. !d. at 25. It has been the rule in the Eleventh Circuit that arbitration awards can be 
vacated upon the non-statutory grounds that the award is "arbitrary and capricious," or that the 
"enforcement" of the award would be contrary to public policy. In a very recent case, the Eleventh 
Circuit has recognized that the New York Convention governing international arbitration awards 
expressly includes the "public policy" reason for vacating an international award, but does not include 
the "arbitrary and capricious" reason. As a result, the court expressly held that the "arbitrary and 
capricious" reason could not be engrafted on the New York Convention as a reason to vacate an 
award. It is a pity that the Eleventh Circuit did not show similar restraint under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte, 141 F3d 1434 (!I"' Cir. 
1998) 
12. Stephen L Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards fiJr Vacatur ol Commercial 
Arbitration Av.ards. 30 GAL REV. 731 (!996). 
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Of course, all of the above hazards may be avoided if the parties in 
their commercial contracts elect U.S. law, and waive any possibility of an 
appeal, and agree that any arbitration award shall be final. 
B. If the Arbitration Agreement Provides for the Vacating of an Award, 
"Where the Arbitrators' Findings of Fact Are Not Supported by 
Substantial Evidence or Where the Arbitrators' Conclusions of Law Are 
Erroneous," May the Reviewing Court Use These Standards in 
Contravention of an Arbitration Statute or Rules' 
In Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 13 the parties entered 
into a commercial contract and agreed to submit any disputes to arbitration 
under the following clause: 
(d) Manner. A party desiring to submit a matter to arbitration shall give 
written notice to the other parties hereto .... The arbitrators shall decide 
the matters submitted based upon the evidence presented, the terms of 
this Agreement, the Agreement in Principle and the laws of the State of 
California. The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state 
the bases of the award and include detailed findings of fact and conclu· 
sions of law. The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California may enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming 
the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court 
shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the 
grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitra-
tors' findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) 
where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous. 14 
Arbitration was conducted before a panel of three arbitrators, and the 
losing party appealed to the district court to overturn the award on the 
grounds specified in the italicized wording above. The district court held 
that it could not review the award under the substantial evidence or the 
error of law standard. 
Upon appeal to the court of appeals, it was held by a majority of the 
court that "[t]his appeal boils down to one major issue: Is federal court re-
view of an arbitration agreement necessarily limited to the grounds set 
forth in the FAS or can the court apply greater scrutiny if the parties have 
so agreed?" 15 
The court stated that arbitration is a matter of the parties contracting to 
submit their disputes to arbitration, and that the terms of the contract re-
quiring judicial scrutiny of the arbitrators' findings of fact and law are 
13. 130 F.3d 884 (9'" Cir. 1997). 
14. /d. at 886 (emphasis added) 
15. !d. at 889. 
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binding on the parties even when the arbitration contract (as in this con-
tract) calls for the application of Article 24 of the Rules of Conciliation for 
the International Chamber of Commerce which provides for finality of the 
arbitration award and waiver of judicial review. 
A concurring opinion pointed out that this contract did not attempt to 
confer jurisdiction over this case to the Federal courts, but that the parties' 
contractual intent should prevail. A dissenting opinion stated that the par-
ties "cannot contract for judicial review of that award." 16 
Unfortunately, the opinion gives no hint as to why the parties con-
tracted for judicial review of the facts and the law supporting the arbitra-
tion award when the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce ex-
pressly waive legal and factual appeals. 17 
C. The Difference Between Misconstruing the Law and Disregarding it 
on the Part of the Arbitrators- Do Not Ask the Arbitrators to Disregard 
the Law. 
It is well established in American arbitration law that an award of arbi-
trators will be vacated by the courts, if the arbitrators acknowledge the ex-
istence of statutory or case law on the point in issue and disregard it. 
This view was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court 18 
and then expressly followed in all of the circuit courts, .except the Fifth 
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was recently presented with a 
"manifest disregard of law" challenge in a factually unusual case. 19 A fe-
male employee brought suit in a federal district court seeking overtime 
payments as an employee of Shearson Lehman Bros. Shearson contended 
that she was an exempt employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act as an 
administrator or an executive rather than as a wage clerk. The district court 
referred the case to an arbitration panel which held that the employer did 
not have to pay overtime pay. The employee petitioned the court to vacate 
the award; the court denied the petition and she appealed. 
Counsel for Shearson Lehman in his opening statement before the ar-
bitration panel stated: "I know, as I have served many times as an arbitra-
tor, that you as an arbitrator are not guided strictly to follow case law pre-
cedent. That you can also do what's fair and just and equitable and that is 
what Shearson is asking you to do in this case." During Shearson's closing 
argument, its attorney again stated: 
16. !d. 
17. For a similar result under the Federal Arbitration Act for "errors of law," see Gateway 
Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995). 
18. Wilko v. Swan, 346 US. 427 (1953) 
19. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (lith Cir. 1997). 
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You have to decide whether you're going to follow the statutes that 
have been presented to you, or whether you will do or want to do or 
should do what is right and just and equitable in this case. I know it's 
hard to have to say this and it's probably even harder to hear it but in 
this case this law is not right. Know that there is a difference between 
law and equity and I think, in my opinion, that difference is crystallized 
in this case. The law says one thing. What equity demands and requires 
and is saying is another. What is right and fair and proper in this? You 
know as arbitrators you have the ability, you're not strictly bound by 
case law and precedent. You have the ability to do what is right, what is 
fair and what is proper, and that's what Shearson is asking you to do 20 
Judge Barkett responded to Shearson's argument stating: 
To manifestly disregard the law, one must be conscious of the law 
and deliberately ignore it .... In the case before us, that is precisely 
what the panel was flagrantly and blatantly urged to do. The arbitrators 
expressly took note of this plea in their award when summarizing the par-
ties' arguments. There is nothing in the award or elsewhere in the record 
to indicate that they did not heed this plea. In the absence of any stated 
reasons for the decision and in light of the marginal evidence presented 
to it, we cannot say that this is not what the panel did. We conclude 
that a manifest disregard for the law, in contrast to a misinterpretation, 
misstatement or misapplication of the law, can constitute grounds to va-
cate an arbitration decision. We emphasize again that this ground is a 
narrow one. We apply it here because we are able to clearly discern from 
the record that this is one of those cases where manifest disregard of the 
law is applicable, as the arbitrators recognized that they were told to dis-
regard the law (which the record reflects they knew) in a case in which 
the evidence to support the award was marginal. Thus, there is nothing 
in the record to refute the suggestion that the law was disregarded. Nor 
does the record clearly support the award. 21 
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In spite of the above language, Judge Barkett stated that there is no 
requirement in the law for arbitrators to state the facts or give reasons for 
ruling one way or the other. 
One wonders why the counsel for the employer literally invited the 
arbitrators to disregard the law in light of the general rule that manifest 
disregard invites the courts to vacate an arbitration award. Perhaps counsel 
was relying upon the previous conduct of the Eleventh Circuit in not 
adopting the doctrine. Perhaps, counsel was relying upon the Fifth Cir-
cuit's rejection of the rule and the fact that the Eleventh Circuit was spun 
off from the Fifth Circuit? Counsel won the battle but lost the war. In light 
20. /d. at 1459 
21. /d. at 1461. 
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of the fact that the court of appeals ordered that this case be re-submitted 
to a different arbitration panel, it should seem that the parties will have 
undergone the time and expense of two arbitration panels, one district 
court appeal and the court of appeals' appeal. This arbitration was neither 
quick nor inexpensive. 
D. If a Statute Mandates an Award of Attorneys' Fees to the Winning 
Claimant, the Claimant must Clearly State this Mandatory Award Dutv to 
the Arbitrators in Order to Claim to Vacate the Award for Failure to Do 
So under the "Manifest Disregard" Rule. 
In Dirussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, lnc.,22 a branch manager at a 
stock brokerage firm was allegedly demoted for cause; the manager 
brought arbitration proceedings against his employer based upon his alle-
gation that he was demoted because of his age. He was 58 years old. 
The arbitration panel held in favor of the ex-manager and.awarded him 
substantial damages for wrongful demotion in violation of the Age provi-
sions of the Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The arbitrators 
refused to award attorneys' fees to the ex-manager, although they acknowl-
edged in the award that the ex-manager sought attorneys' fees and costs of 
suit "pursuant to ADEA and NJLAD."23 The ex-manager sought to have 
the award modified, but the district court refused to do so. The ex-manager 
then appealed to the court of appeals. 
The appeals court stated that "Section 626(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S. C. 
§626(b), incorporates reference 29 U.S.C. §2 1 6(b) of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act which states ... "that the court ... shall, in addition to judg-
ment awarded to the plaintiff, ... allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."24 
The court of appeals also quoted the district court's view on the man-
datory nature of the attorney's fees: "The district court found that it is dif-
ficult to imagine a more well defined, explicit and clearly applicable provi-
sion governing law than the ADEA's mandate that successful age discrimi-
nation claimants such as plaintiff recover attorney's fees." 25 
The court of appeals went on to hold that there was persuasive evi-
dence that the arbitrators actually knew of the mandatory nature of the 
attorney's fees and that they knowingly disregarded the law. The court 
clearly stated that the attorney for the ex-manager never articulated the 
mandatory nature nor the provision of the Act which makes an award man-
datory. The attorney's use of the word that his client was "entitled" to the 
22. 121 F.3d 818 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
23 /datSig 
24. !d. at 822. 
25. !d. at 822. 
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award did not clearly inform the arbitrators that it was mandatory to award 
attorneys' fees. The court also noted that the suit was based upon a New 
Jersey statute which says that the court or the arbitrators may award attor-
neys' fees. Finally, the court stated that it was not going to infer from the 
facts of the case that the arbitrators knew of the law and that they mani-
festly disregarded it. 
E. Should a Court Vacate an Arbitration Award for "Manifest 
Disregard of the Law" When the Decisional Law of the State Is Unclear 
or in Conflict? 
In Barnes v. Logan, 26 a customer brought arbitration proceedings 
against his personal securities broker and his employer-security firm for 
churning, mismanagement of the account, and misrepresentation. An arbi-
tration panel awarded the customer large compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. The brokers moved the federal court to vacate the punitive damage 
award on the grounds that the arbitrators had applied the law of California 
rather than the law of Minnesota whose law had been expressly adopted in 
the brokerage contract. The appellate court agreed that the arbitrators were 
wrong when they applied California law, but that error was harmless. The 
court looked at seemingly conflicting Minnesota intermediate appellate 
court decisions wherein one held that punitive damages in Minnesota 
could be awarded for breach of contract cases involving fraud but no per-
sonal injuries, and the other case held that damages could be awarded only 
in cases involving personal injury. The court then stated: "If, under the 
current law of the state of the law, a Minnesota intermediate appellate 
court can conclude that punitive damages are available even though no 
personal injury is involved, we cannot conclude that the arbitrators acted in 
manifest disregard of Minnesota law in awarding punitive damages."27 
When the decisional law is in an apparent conflict, then whatever 
choice the arbitrator makes would not seem to be in manifest disregard of 
the law. 
F. Even in Routine Statute of Limitations Cases, it Is Difficult to Vacate 
the Arbitrator's Award When They Do Not Give Reasons and Allow the 
Claimant's Claim as Being Timely. 
In Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 28 Mr. Jaros 
maintained accounts at Merrill Lynch from 1987 to 1990. Mr. Jaros in-
vested $472,601 with Merrill Lynch and his accounts were down to 
26. 122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1997). 
27. /d. at 823. 
28. 70 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1995) 
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$270,000 when he closed them. Merrill Lynch made 624 trades during the 
accounts' lifetimes and earned commissions of $270,000. Jaros was con-
tracted before each trade was made, and he never objected. In November 
of 1990, Jaros transferred his accounts to another broker. On December 
18, 1990, Jaros's son (an attorney) wrote a letter to Merrill Lynch com-
plaining about the way the accounts had been handled. Merrill Lynch re-
sponded, and seven months later Merrill Lynch wrote that they had found 
no wrongful conduct by the company or their agent. Jaros started arbitra-
tion proceedings on August 20, 1992, and Merrill Lynch claimed that the 
one-year federal statute of limitations and the Ohio four-year statute of 
limitations barred state claims that arose prior to August 20, 1988. The 
arbitrators (two of the three were attorneys) held in favor of Jaros and 
awarded him $250,000. The award did not state any reasons for the award 
(a "non-speaking" award under U.S. law). 
The district court upheld the award. The court of appeals recounted 
how difficult it was to attack an award when arbitrators do not provide rea-
sons for the award. The court of appeals did say that it would appear that 
the federal one-year period had elapsed, but that the various claims under 
the Ohio four-year statute had not all elapsed, and therefore, upheld the 
district court. The court also noted that there were no facts indicating an 
equitable estoppel, which might have delayed the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
The conclusion of the opinion is a classical statement about the notion 
of manifest disregard: 
From this vantage point, it is impossible to tell what determination 
the arbitration panel made with respect to the timeliness of each claim. It 
is clear that a number of arguments were presented by the parties to the 
panel. As is permissible, the award fails to set out any explanation of the 
resolution of these arguments pertaining to the motion to dismiss. 
Set within the context of the narrow scope of review for manifest 
disregard of the Jaw, the court finds that the arbitrators' decision was not 
so patently contrary to established legal precedents as to necessitate that 
the award be vacated. Although it is likely that the federal securities 
claims were not timely brought, there is ample room for reasonable de-
bate as to both those claims and the state law claims. It being improper 
for a court to go behind the face of an arbitration award and attempt to 
fathom the resolution of arguments presented to the panel, we must con-
firm the award as if there is a conceivable rational basis supporting the 
decision. 29 
The holding of this case should be utilized by any arbitrator in a 
"close" case to avoid having the arbitration award upset on appeal. On the 
29. !d. at 422. 
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other hand, each party to an arbitration usually desires to learn why he/she 
won or lost. At the outset of the arbitration the parties may insist upon a 
"reasoned" award. 
G. An Arbitrator's Award "Must Draw its Essence from the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement"- or it Will Be Vacated by the Courts. 
In Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 30 an employee was 
arrested for having drug paraphernalia in his possession. The employee 
was promptly fired, and he demanded arbitration proceedings over his dis-
charge. The employee was later tried and found guilty of the charge of pos-
session of drug paraphernalia, but sentence was suspended and he was 
placed on probation for two years. The findings in the criminal trial were 
admitted in the arbitration proceedings. 
The employer asserted in the arbitration that the employee violated 
Rule 30 of the employer's rules which prohibited "[t]he use or possession 
of intoxicating beverages or narcotics on plant premises or working under 
the influence of either."31 In addition to Rule 30 of the employer's work 
rules, the employer also submitted its drug memorandum sent to all em-
ployees: 
B. Upon any ... criminal drug statute conviction for a violation occur-
ring either in or outside the workplace, the employee will be subject to 
disciplinary action at the sole discretion of the company, up to and in-
cluding discharge, depending upon the circumstances 32 
The arbitrator nonetheless ... refused to consider this policy because: 
The Employer's proof shows that [the state court] suspended the 
imposition of sentence. As of this writing, a suspended imposition of 
sentence is not a conviction. 33 
The district court agreed with this reasoning .... On appeal, Alvey 
renews its contention that the arbitrator impermissibly substituted his 
discretion for that of the company in interpreting and applying Alvey's 
work rules. To the limited extent that the arbitrator failed properly to 
consider the applicability of Section 4.B., we agree. 
The Missouri cases cited by the arbitrator and by the district court 
construed the technical term "conviction" under Missouri criminal law 
and then applied that construction to a witness impeachment statute and 
a public employer's manual. Those decisions do not resolve this case. 
The issue here is the intended meaning of the word "conviction" in Sec-
30. 132 F3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1997). 
31 !d. at 1211. 
32. !d. at 1212. (emphasis added). 
33. !d. at 1213. 
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tion 4.B. of Alvey's work rule implementing the Drug Free Workplace 
Act. The arbitrator wholly ignored that issue. Instead of looking at the 
word in context, taking into account its ordinary meaning and any perti-
nent plant practices or history, the arbitrator adopted his own, hyper-
technical meaning derived from a contextually inapposite source in state 
law. The result of this misguided approach is a highly suspect conclu-
sion. Although our views on the question are of course not controlling, 
we think it strains credulity to posit that an employer who defines drug-
offenses-warranting-discharge to include "a criminal drug statute convic-
tion" would intend to exclude from that category criminal trials that end 
in findings of guilt and sentences of probation plus the deferred imposi-
tion of a more punitive sentence. 
At this point, we return to the governing standard of review, 
whether the arbitrator's award "dr[e]w its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement." Is the flaw we have identified simply a mistaken 
interpretation of the contract that we must uphold, or does it violate the 
fundamental principle that "an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and 
application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dis-
pense his own brand of industrial justice"? Although the issue is not free 
from doubt, we conclude it is the latter. An arbitrator may look to out-
side sources to aid in interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, but 
he must construe the contract; he may not amend it. Here, the arbitrator 
effectively wrote a relevant work rule out of the agreement by looking 
exclusively at an inconclusive outside source. This part of the arbitra-
tor's award cannot be said to draw its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement.34 
What the court is really saying is that the employer had its definition of 
the word "conviction" while the Supreme Court of Missouri has another 
definition. 
It is suggested that another arbitrator who hears this case and applies 
the employer's notion of what a conviction means will have his award at-
tacked on the ground of a "manifest disregard of the law." Sometimes, an 
arbitrator's lot is not a happy one. 
34. /d. at 1213 (citations omitted) 
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H. An Arbitration Panel's Refusal to Continue the Hearings in Order to 
Allow the Corporate President an Opportunity to Testify May Constitute 
Fundamental Unfairness and Misconduct Sufficient to Vacate an Award 
under Section JO(a)(J) of the Federal Arbitration Act. 
In Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, 35 two companies were involved in a 
controversy before a panel of arbitrators; each party accused the other of 
fraudulent misrepresentation which induced them to enter into the con-
tract. Each party was represented in the negotiations of the contract by pri-
marily one person, and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations allegedly 
occurred during the discussions between the two individuals. One presi-
dent allegedly wanted to testify, but was unable to schedule hearings be-
cause of an unexpected reoccun·ence of his wife's cancer. This party then 
requested a continuation of the hearings until the president was able totes-
tify. The panel did not grant the continuance and stated: "We as arbitrators 
have to decide does Mr. Pollack have any information that if he was here 
in person and you fellows are banging him with questions that some new 
information comes out that we haven't heard or is it going to be a rehash 
of what we've heard from other witnesses."36 
The district court refused to vacate the award. Upon appeal, the court 
noted that virtually all of the documentary evidence admitted before the 
arbitration panel consisted of letters, etc., that dealt with efforts to have 
both parties abide by the contracts, and that the controversy in the arbitra-
tion proceedings dealt primarily with alleged fraudulent inducements by 
both parties. The court then noted that: 
These so-called fight letters and reports are not all representative of 
what Pollock's testimony would likely have been in connection with the 
fraudulent inducement allegations. The fight letters arose from individ-
ual problems that were ongoing at the time, and did not devolve into re-
criminations about earlier representations. Their focus was not nn the 
inducement to enter the contracts- rather, they were attempts to solve 
problems which were giving rise to disputes. As Delaney explained, the 
parties were trying "[t]o keep the relationship going." The reports, like 
the letters, addressed discrete problems and possible courses of action. 
While the letters and reports might have been sufficient to represent 
what Pollock would have testified to in rebuttal of Neptune's breach of 
contract claims, which we do not decide, there is nothing to suggest that 
Pollock's intended testimony concerning appellees' fraudulent induce-
ment claim and Bertek's counterclaim for fraudulent inducement was 
addressed by the documents admitted into evidence. 
35. 120 F3d 16 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
36. /d. at 18. 
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Because Bertek's alleged misrepresentations were not documented, 
appellees' unsupported oral testimony concerning such representations 
was unrebutted because Pollock, who allegedly made the representations 
on Bertek' s behalf, was not allowed to testify, and he is the only person 
who could have done so. 37 
Finally, the court of appeals held that the refusal to continue the hear-
ings amounted to fundamental unfairness and misconduct sufficient to va-
cate the award under Section 1 0( a)(3) of the FAA. 
I. As a General Rule Arbitrators Are Not Required to Articulate How 
They Calculated the Amount of Damages A warded. 
In Conntech Development Co. v. University of Connecticut Education 
Properties, Inc., 38 the parties contracted with each other to construct a re-
search and development park on the campus of the University of Connecti-
cut. The contract contained an arbitration clause. The parties each claimed 
that the other had defaulted, and arbitration proceedings were conducted. 
The arbitrators entered an award in favor of one party and awarded dam-
ages of $2,413,179. The losing party filed suit to vacate the award on the 
grounds that the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority. The dis-
trict court affirmed the award and the amount of award, and the loser ap-
pealed. The main issue in controversy was the fact that the arbitrators did 
not disclose how they computed damages of $2,413,179 which prevented 
effective judicial review. 
The underlying arbitration records showed that both parties cited con-
struction costs ranging as high as six million dollars. The court noted that 
arbitrators are not usually required to spell out their monetary calculations 
in the award, however: 
Where an arbitrator's award appears to have been reached on the 
basis of a precise mathematical calculation, it is desirable, and in some 
cases may be necessary, to know the basis for the calculations underly-
ing the award. A remand for clarification in such circumstances would 
not improperly require arbitrators to reveal their reasons, but would in-
stead simply require them to fulfill their obligation to explain the award 
sufficiently to permit effective judicial review.39 
In spite of the quoted language, the court held that "[g)iven the ex-
penses incurred by both parties, grounds for the award can be 'inferred 
37. /d. at 20. 
38. 102 F3d 677 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
39. /d. at 688. 
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from the facts of the case'," and remand for clarification was unneces-
sary.4o 
It is submitted that the precise nature of the award creates the suspi-
cion that it was achieved by adding the amounts suggested by each of the 
arbitrators and then dividing the resulting figure by three; shades of a quo-
tient verdict by a lay jury. On the other hand, a similar verdict by a lay jury 
would have been immune from attack, unless the rule against quotient ver-
dicts had been applied. Surely, an award by sophisticated arbitrators 
should be as much respected as the finding of a lay jury without any spe-
cial education. 
III. JURISDICTION OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION CLAUSES, ETC. 
A. Commercial Law Lawyers Must Know More than Commercial Law 
and Arbitration Law. 
In Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex, 41 Twist (a clothing manufac-
turer) ordered fabric from Seatex, a New York Company, through Seatex's 
agent by means of telephone calls and facsimile transmissions. Seatex con-
firmed these purchase orders by facsimile transmittal of its standard sales 
confirmation forms. The forms mentioned the notion of arbitration on the 
front page in small print and again on the reverse side in two full clauses. 
Twist never signed the Seatex forms, but purchased and paid for the fabric 
in at least three transactions. The fabric allegedly was defective, and Twist 
filed suit in a Colorado state court. Seatex removed the action to the Colo-
rado federal district court. Seatex sought to have the federal court compel 
arbitration even though Twist never signed the sales confirmation forms, 
nor ever sought to protest the inclusion of the arbitration clauses in the 
Seatex forms. 
Both parties submitted that Section 2-207 of the Colorado and New 
York versions of the Uniform Commercial Codes contained were identical. 
This section states that non-conforming clauses become part of a contract 
unless the non-conforming clauses materially alter the other party's form. 
Twist asserted that Colorado law applied, but the district court held that 
since Section 2-207 read the same way in Colorado and in New York, it 
was not necessary to consider the application of any one state's law. In 
addition, the arbitration clause provided that any arbitration must be 
brought within one year, and the claim for arbitration came after this one 
year period had expired. 
40. /d. at 687. 
41. 126 F.3d 1279 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
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The district court held that the arbitration had become a part of the par-
ties's contract, and that the claim of Twist was barred because of the one 
year time limitation. 
The court of appeals held that the arbitration clause might be a mate-
rial alteration of Twist's purchase order form; that Seatex would have the 
burden of proving that a trade usage existed in the textile industry to have 
arbitration clauses in textile sales contracts and that Twist failed to sustain 
this burden. 
The court of appeals noted that Section 2-725( I) of the New York 
UCC permits the parties to shorten the limitation period for lawsuits to one 
year, while the Colorado UCC Section 4-2-275(1) does not permit a short-
ening of the limitation period; hence a Colorado party might well be sur-
prised by the one year clause in this case. Therefore, the one year limita-
tion period might not become part of the sales contract. 
Finally, the court rejected a claim by Seatex that the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act preempts the application of the one-year rule under state law. 
The court reversed the district court by stating: 
The district court should have begun its analysis with a choice of 
law determination. Its failure to do so affected all of the court's subse-
quent determinations regarding the arbitration term. We therefore re-
verse and remand for the district court to make the choice of law deter-
mination. 
We REVERSE the district court's stay of litigation and remand this 
case for a choice of law determination and for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. Because we reverse the district court's stay 
pending arbitration, we do not reach the questions of whether arbitration 
became part of the Twist/Seatex contract as a matter of law or whether 
the district court properly granted summary judgment to Seatex for 
Twist's failure to timely arbitrate. We leave those issues to the district 
court to remand.42 
It is difficult to fathom how the district court overlooked the choice of 
law problems inherent in this case with a contract fom1ed between citizens 
of different states and jurisdiction based upon diversity. A simple glance at 
the annotations in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE 
under Section 2-207 and 2-725(1) would easily show the diversity of 
views about the materiality issue. The attorneys for the Colorado litigant at 
least claimed that Colorado law applied, although we are not told what the 
argument was based on. Perhaps, the law schools should go back to the old 
fashioned required curriculum. 
42. !d. at 1288. 
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B. Lawyers Who Draft Employment Contracts Are Warned Not to 
Forget (or Overlook) What They Should Have Learned in Their First-
year Contracts Class- a Binding Contract must Be Supported by 
Consideration. 
In Gibson v. Neighbor Clinics, Inc., 43 a female employee left her em-
ployment at a company and shortly thereafter she returned for re-employ-
ment at the same company. During her absence, the company had prepared 
a new Associates Policy Manual (the "Manual") and required employees 
to sign a new "Associates Understanding" (the "Understanding"). The 
"Understanding" included the following statement: "I agree to the griev-
ance and arbitration provisions set forth in the Associates Policy Manual. I 
understand that I am waiving my right to a trial, including a jury trial, in 
state or federal court of the class of disputes specifically set forth in the 
grievance and arbitration provisions on pages 8-10 of the Manual."44 
The Manual stated that when an employee alleges a violation of her 
rights under the Anti- Discrimination Act of Title VII: 
THEN IT IS CLEARLY INTENDED AND AGREED THAT THE 
SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE MEANS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF ALL 
DISPUTES, ISSUES, CONTROVERSIES, CLAIMS, CAUSES OF AC-
TION OR GRIEVANCES BY AN EMPLOYEE AGAINST NEIGH-
BORHOOD HEALTH CLINICS SHALL BE THROUGH THE PRO-
CESS OF ARBITRATION AND PURSUANT TO ... THE INDIANA 
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT.45 
When the employee signed the above "Understanding" form, the hir-
ing officer could not find a copy of the Manual for the employee to read; 
nevertheless, the employee signed the "Understanding." Later that after-
noon, the employee was presented with a copy of the "Understanding" but 
she did not read it at that time. 
Subsequently, the employee was allegedly subjected to sexual harass-
ment and when she reported the incidents to management, she was dis-
charged from employment. The former employee sued the company for 
sexual harassment and failure to comply with the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act ("ADA"). The company moved to dismiss on the grounds that she 
had agreed to submit to arbitration rather than to sue, and the District 
Court dismissed the case. The former employee appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
43. 121 F3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997) 
44. /d. at 1128. 
45. /d. 
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In the appeals court, the parties waged battle over the issue whether 
the waiving of the right to judicial proceedings under the ADA and Title 
VII requires a knowing and voluntary waiver in light of the fact that the 
employee never read the "Manual" at the time she signed the "Understand-
ing." The court avoided deciding this issue by focusing attention on 
whether the waiver of judicial suit rights was supported by consideration. 
The court noted that the opening two paragraphs of the "Manual" 
stated: 
Neighborhood Health Clinics reserves the right at any time to mod-
ify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or change any or all terms of this Man-
ual, plans, policies, or procedures, in whole or in part, without having to 
consult or reach agreement with anyone, at any time, with or without 
notice .... 
. . . [W]hile Neighborhood Health Clinics intends to abide by the poli-
cies and procedures described in this Manual, it does not constitute a 
contract nor promise of any kind. Therefore, employees can be termi-
nated at any time, with or without notice, and with or without cause 46 
The employer's attorney "drafted" the employer out of arbitration by 
saying, in effect, that the employer gave the employee virtually nothing in 
return for her promise to arbitrate. The employer never promised to con-
tinue to employ her, and the employer never bound itself to do anything in 
return for her promise. If the employer had exchanged its promise to her in 
return for her promise to arbitrate then the contract would be supported by 
consideration. 
The court also stressed that the arbitration approach was a newly es-
tablished one which had not been in effect during the employee's prior 
employment. Too often lawyers think that their labor is over once they 
have drafted a document. Supervisory employees need education in the use 
of documents and the timing of their use. 
C. Drafters of Guaranties Who Intend That the Guarantors Are to Be 
Bound by Arbitration Should Insert Words in the Guaranty Clearly 
Stating That the Guarantors Agree to Be Bound by Arbitration. 
In Grundstad v. Ritt,47 two parties entered into a non-compete agree-
ment. The agreement provided for arbitration as follows: "In the event that 
any dispute or controversy arises under this Agreement between the par-
ties, then, and in such event, both parties agree to submit the matter to ar-
bitration to be conducted in accordance with the rules of the American Ar-
46. !d. 
47. 106 F.3d 201 (7th Cir. 1997) 
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bitration Association, which arbitration shall be held in Springfield, Massa-
chusetts. "4R 
Two guarantors signed their names on the Agreement, and immedi-
ately below their signatures appeared the language "[ w ]e hereby guarantee 
all of the provisions of the within Agreement, and especially the perfor-
mance of Atlantic hereunder. This 1Oth day of July, 1981."49 
Paragraph four of the Agreement referred to the guaranty: "[Atlantic 
Associates] agrees to obtain the signatures of two of the beneficiaries un-
der a certain trust that holds the shares in [Atlantic Associates], Messrs. H. 
Joel Rahn and Oddmund Grundstad to this Agreement guaranteeing all of 
the terms, covenants and provisions as well as the performance of [Atlantic 
Associates] hereunder. "50 
Atlantic defaulted on its obligation and an assignee of the above con-
tract insisted on arbitration proceedings against Atlantic. He received an 
award in arbitration, which Atlantic refused to pay. The state court af-
firmed the award. The assignee then demanded arbitration against the 
guarantors in order to collect on the guaranty. One guarantor then brought 
suit in the federal district court to enjoin arbitration. The district court us-
ing the general principles of contract law held that the guarantors were 
bound by the arbitration clause and entered summary judgment against the 
guarantor. 
Upon appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held 
that the above-quoted language did not clearly indicate that the guarantors 
unambiguously intended to be bound personally by the arbitration clause, 
and that summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings. 
In light of this case, it would seem wise for drafters of guaranties who 
wish that the guarantors be bound by arbitration proceedings to insert 
words in the guaranty stating clearly that they agree to be bound by arbitra-
tion in any matter relative to the carrying out of the guaranty. 
D. Claims for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act May Be 
Subject to Arbitration Between the Parents of a Disabled Child and a 
Private Grammar School. 
In Bercovitch v. Baldwin School Ind., 51 the parents of a young boy 
sued a private school for refusing to admit their son to the seventh grade 
because the son had a lengthy history (from kindergarten through the sixth 
48. /d. at 202. 
49. /d. at 203. 
50. /d. 
51. 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998) 
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grade) of consistent misbehavior. The school demanded arbitration pursu-
ant to a clause in the enrollment agreement. The arbitrators ruled in favor 
of the school, and the parents sought to vacate the award. The district court 
vacated the award and ordered the school to modify the school's code of 
conduct in order to accommodate the child. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed the district court by hold-
ing that the district court exceeded its authority in ordering the school "to 
suspend is normal codes of conduct in order to tolerate disruptive and dis-
respectful conduct when that behavior impaired the educational experience 
of the other students and significantly taxed the resources of the faculty 
and administration."52 
The appeals court added that ADA does not require a school to: "com-
promise its integral criteria to accommodate a disabled individual."53 The 
court also noted that Section 12212 of the ADA expressly encourages the 
arbitration of disputes and that arbitration was proper to enforce claims 
under the Age Discrimination Act. 54 
E. The Waiver of the Right to Arbitration in an Employee's Employment 
Contract May Be Contrary to Public Policy and Unenforceable. 
In Thomas James Associates, Inc. v. Jameson, 55 Jameson was em-
ployed by a stock brokerage firm in 1993. His employment contract with 
the firm provided that Jameson waived arbitration as a method of settling 
any disputes with his employer. Jameson allegedly failed to follow instruc-
tions from his supervisor, and he was terminated. In addition, the former 
employer informed people, inquiring about the termination, that Jameson 
was terminated for cause and there was, at least, an implication of unethi-
cal conduct by Jameson. Jameson then brought arbitration proceedings 
against the former employer and two officers of the employer. 
The employer maintained that Jameson, in his employment contract, 
had waived arbitration as a settlement device. In addition, the brokerage 
asserted that the National Association of Security Dealers' employment 
rules denied arbitration to employees. 
The brokerage firm then brought suit to obtain a declaratory judgment 
that employees of stock-brokerage firms were not entitled to arbitration to 
settle their employment disputes with employers. The district court dis-
missed the suit, and the brokerage company appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit. 
52. !d. at 152. 
53. !d. 
54. /d. 
55. 102 FJd 60 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
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The court of appeals found that until 1993 the rights of employees to 
arbitrate their disputes with their stockbroker employers were not clear 
because of seemingly inconsistent NASD rules. The courts of appeal were 
divided. However, in 1993, the NASD restated their rules in more precise 
language, and the rules expressly authorized and encouraged arbitration as 
a means of settlement. In addition, the new rules stated that "it shall be 
considered conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade 
and a violation of Article Ill, section 1 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Prac-
tice for a member to require its associated persons to waive the arbitration 
of disputes arising out of their association with the member."56 
The court held that the self-regularity association's rules governed the 
employment contract at issue and if they prohibit the waiving of arbitration 
it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the waiver. The parties 
may not contractually waive arbitration. 
F. "As Long as the Arbitrator's Decision Draws its Essence from the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Arbitrator Is Not Fashioning 
His Own Brand of Industrial Justice, We Will Decline to Vacate the 
Award. "57 
The above statement (or similar statements) have long been a shibbo-
leth in labor-union-arbitration cases. This statement of law was recited in a 
recent case58 in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
arbitrators' award. 
A female employee asked her supervisor for permission to leave the 
job for approximately one hour. When the supervisor asked her why she 
wanted to leave, she said that she had to give her truck to her daughter so 
that the daughter could go to the doctor. During her absence, her fellow 
employees told the supervisor that the real reason for the time off was that 
she had to take cash to the power company or she would be without lights 
for the ensuing weekend. The supervisor questioned the employee upon 
her return ( 45 minutes later), and she confessed that she had lied to him 
about why she needed time off. The employee was embarrassed because 
she had failed to pay her light bill, so she misstated the purpose of her ab-
sence. 
The employee's supervisor terminated her employment after he con-
sulted with higher personnel. The arbitrator, after hearings, reinstated the 
employee and imposed a ten-day suspension from work. The company 
56. /d. at 66. 
57. Bruce Hardwood Floors v. UBC, Southern Council of lndust. Workers. Local Union No. 
27 n. 103 F3d 449 (5th Cir. 1997) 
58. !d. 
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then sought to vacate the award in the federal district court. The district 
court affirmed the award, however. 
The company appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which 
reversed the district court. The circuit court cited the provisions of the Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement as justification for terminating the em-
ployee: 
The pertinent discharge and progressive discipline provisions of the 
CBA are as follows: 
ARTICLE 24, SECTION 2. The Company will take action against an em-
ployee based upon conduct which warrants immediate discharge, or for 
other conduct, while less serious, which initially warrants less severe 
discipline. 
(a) An employee will be discharged immediately without prior warning 
for the following or similar reasons: 
( 16) Stealing, immoral conduct, or any act on the Company 
premises intended to destroy property or inflict bodily injury. 
(b) An employee will be subject to progressive discipline for the follow-
ing or similar reasons: 
(I) Absenteeism. 
(2) Tardiness. 
(3) Inefficiency or poor work performance. 
( 4) Abuse of rest periods and lunch periods. 
(5) Neglecting duty or failing to maintain work standards. 
SECTION 3. In the case of offenses where the application of progressive 
discipline would be appropriate as set forth in (b) above, the Company 
shall endeavor to adhere to the following order: 
(a) Verbal warning with written record of warning for the first incident. 
(b) Written warning for the second incident. 
(c) Disciplinary suspension of three (3) unpaid days for the third inci-
dent. 
(d) Discharge for the fourth incident. 
In agreeing to the foregoing, however, the Company does not intend 
to waive the exercise of its right to discipline or discharge without fol-
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lowing such order in any case where it determines that the seriousness of 
the particular offense involved warrants discipline of a different order. 59 
The arbitrator concluded that: 
The Grievant's conduct was not such that demands the supreme in-
dustrial penalty of immediate discharge. The Company wrongfully at-
tempted to apply the referenced provisions of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement to the Grievant's conduct. The parties negotiated a progres-
sive discipline policy which the Company failed to follow. 
Considering the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing, and 
considering the presentations made by the parties in their post hearing 
briefs, the Arbitrator has adequate reason to substitute his judgement 
[sic] for that of Company's management.60 
The district court judge stated that "the arbitrator confined his decision 
and remedy to the interpretation and application of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and that the arbitrator provide[d] an award which was 
within the essence of the collective bargaining agreement."61 
It is submitted that the court of appeals vacated this award and re-
versed the district court because of, at the worst, a misinterpretation of the 
facts and law. 
As stated by the dissenting Judge: 
The arbitrator concluded that the company's attempt to characterize 
Dixon's conduct a~ "immoral conduct" within the meaning of Article 24, 
Section 2(a)(l6) of the CBA was unreasonable. That section allows the 
company to terminate employees immediately for "stealing, immoral 
conduct, or any act on the Company premises intended to destroy prop-
erty or inflict bodily injury." The majority erroneously states that "lying" 
is "specifically covered" by this provision and concludes that this provi-
sion is dispositive. Lying is not, however, specifically listed in this pro-
vision, nor is immoral conduct expressly defined by the CBA to include 
lying. Instead the majority's conclusion requires an inferential step, that 
any lie is "immoral conduct" justifying immediate termination within the 
meaning of the CBA. In other words, the majority interprets the term 
"immoral conduct" and comes to a conclusion different from that 
reached by the arbitrator. That is not the court's proper role. In review-
ing the arbitrator's construction of the phrase "immoral conduct," the 
issue is not what we believe to be moral or immoral conduct in the philo-
sophical sense. The issue before the arbitrator was whether Dixon's con-
59. !d. at 451 (emphasis added) 
60. /d. 
61. !d. 
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duct rose to the level of "immoral conduct" as that term is used in the 
CBA."2 
When one tries to balance one minor lie and 45 minutes freedom from 
work against the costs and time expended in an arbitration proceeding, a 
federal district court case and an appeal to the court of appeals, it would 
seem obvious that there must have been other unstated factors for the em-
ployee's dismissal. The fact that her fellow employees "tattled" to her su-
pervisor indicates that she was not popular with her fellow employees, and 
perhaps she was not popular with her employer. 
In this case, the punishment did not fit the crime. 
G. A Construction Development Contract May Lack So Many Terms 
Agreed upon by the Parties That it May Not Be Subject to Arbitration. 
In Hill's Pet Nutrition. Inc. v. Fru-Con Construction Corp., 63 the par-
ties to a construction-development contract agreed on many terms in a 
"master agreement" for plants to be constructed; however, the contract did 
not adequately cover costs of construction, allocation of costs, etc. The 
parties continued to operate under the "master agreement" supplemented 
with oral agreements as the work proceeded in two different states. The 
parties then attempted arbitration proceedings, but the district court held 
that lack of agreement on a single term meant there was no contract on any 
term. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of arbitration, but quarreled 
with the district court's rationale. The court of appeals held that the lack of 
"closure" regarding cost overruns which were governed by the oral agree-
ments at a particular plant prevented arbitration of that main issue and 
these alleged overruns were not covered by the "master agreement." As the 
court put it: 
Thus the arbitration clause, although part of the parties' agreement, does 
not come into play. Fru-Con is really seeking a form of interest arbitra-
tion, under which an arbitrator would decide which party's definition of 
"costs" should be accepted, what multiplier should be used, and so on. 
These were issues left open at the bargaining table, issues the parties did 
not agree to pass to an arbitrator for rcsolution 64 
This decision by Judge Easterbrook seems to be technically correct, 
but let us look at the result. Unless the parties can work out an amicable 
settlement, the aggrieved party will seek recovery in quantum meruit and a 
oc. Jd at 454. 
63. 101 FJd nl (7'" Cir. 1996) 
64. /d. at 66. 
293] FEDERAL ARBITRATION POTPOURRI 323 
state or federal judge (with little or no knowledge of construction) will 
have the "delightful" task of trying to calculate monetary amounts, etc. as 
compared to arbitrators who are usually chosen because of their expertise 
in construction costs, procedures, etc. 
H. The Affects on Jurisdiction of Narrow Arbitration Clauses ("Any 
Disputes Arising Hereunder") and Broad Clauses ("Any Disputes 
Arising out of or Relating To"). 
In American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, 
Inc., 65 the submission to arbitration clause provided that "[a]ny dispute, 
controversy, or claim arising out of or related to this Consulting Agree 
ment shall be resolved by binding arbitration."66 
The parties got into disputes and in addition to direct interpretation 
claims under the arbitration agreement, one party sought arbitration of 
claims that the other party had induced a consultant to breach fiduciary 
duties, had committed tortuous interference with a consultant's relation-
ship to an aggrieved party, and a quantum meruit claim. The other party 
denied coverage by arbitration of these claims. 
The federal district court held that the claims were not subject to arbi-
tration. The other pmty appealed, and the court of appeals held that under 
the broad arbitration clause of "[a]ny disputes arising out of or related to" 
the arbitration tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and decide the claims. The 
court noted that the narrow clause of "any disputes arising hereunder" 
would limit the arbitration to the interpretation and application of the con-
tract and would preclude jurisdiction over these "related" disputes. 67 
If the parties to a contract favor arbitration, they should insist upon a 
"broad" arbitration clause. Otherwise, any dispute may be subject to a bi-
furcated approach with simultaneous arbitration and litigation cases, which 
are time and money wasteful and generally a headache for all parties. 
I. A Court May Deny Compulsory Arbitration of an Employee's Claim of 
Civil Rights Violations under Title VII of the 199 I Civil Rights Act If the 
Arbitration Panel Is Structurally Biased Against Employees in Favor of 
Stockbroker-employers. 
65. 96 F.3d 88 (4'" Cir. 1996) 
66. !d. at 90. 
67. ConzpareMediterranean Enter., Inc. v. SS Angyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9"' Cir. 
1983): Sinva, Inc. v. Menill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 253 F.Supp. 359, 364 (S.D. N.Y. 
1966). 
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In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 68 the plaintiff, a consultant to a stock 
brokerage firm, claimed she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, and 
that she had suffered age and sex discrimination contrary to the federal 
law. The stock brokerage firm alleged that her claims were subject to arbi-
tration because she had signed the Securities Industry Standard Form U-4 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement. 
The plaintiff submitted evidence that the system of arbitration was 
structurally biased against employees, and in favor of management. The 
federal district court held that: 
what is deeply troubling is what I can only describe as a structural bias 
in the system - the extent to which the NYSE arbitration system is 
dominated by the securities industry, that is, by the employment side of 
this dispute. The securities arbitration systems are part of a scheme in 
which securities industry firms form self-regulating organizations 
(SROs) to police themselves .... The SROs, in turn, run almost every 
aspect of the arbitration process in which the employees must have their 
employment discrimination cases resolved 69 
The court noted that: 
Saying the NYSE "cannot meet ... minimal standards of arbitral inde-
pendence," ... "[f]rom the rules that govern arbitral procedure, through 
the selection of the arbitrators [drawn from pools appointed by the 
NYSE chairman], to the details of discovery practice, the system is dom-
inated by the NYSE itself. Merrill Lynch, in turn, helps govern the 
NYSE. 70 
It would appear that purchasers of stocks and bonds could make the 
same bias argument in claims against stockbrokers who demand arbitra-
tion, and similar arguments could be raised by employees and consumers 
in other self-regulated trades and industries. 
J. The Preclusive Effect of a Prior Arbitration Award Is GeneraLly a 
Matter for the Arbitrator in a Subsequent Arbitration Proceeding Be-
tween the Same Parties. 
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Beclo Pe-
troleum Corp., 71 a group of insurance companies jointly insured an oil ex-
ploration company in Peru against the risk of expropriation. The Peruvian 
government did expropriate the oil company's assets in Peru, and the oil 
68. !63 F3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998) 
69. !d. 
70. !d. at 54. 
71. 88 F3d 129 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
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company sought to recover for its losses. The insurance companies sought 
to rescind the policies on the grounds of material misrepresentations by the 
insured. Arbitration proceedings were brought, and the arbitrators ruled 
against the rescission of the insurance policies and awarded millions of 
dollars to the insured. Later, a claim was brought against the insurance 
companies for losses incurred when the Peruvian government expropriated 
some oil tankers owned by the oil company. The oil company recovered a 
large settlement from the insurance companies because of this loss. Years 
later, the insurance companies sought arbitration against the oil company 
for recovery of monies from the Peruvian government. The oil company, 
in this second arbitration, claimed that these matters were dealt with in the 
prior arbitration, and this precluded any recovery in the second arbitration. 
The insurance companies claimed that this issue was subject to court deter-
mination, while the oil company contended that the arbitrators had juris-
diction to determine it. 
The court pointed out that the arbitration clause in the marine policy is 
sufficiently broad to encompass disputes about what was decided in a prior 
arbitration. The provision covered "all disputes which may arise under or 
in connection with this policy."72 The court held that the broad arbitration 
clause coupled with the view that any ambiguity regarding arbitration 
should be construed in favor of arbitration required the arbitrators in the 
second arbitration to decide the preclusive effect of the first arbitration. 
K. Arbitrators and Organizations Which Appoint Arbitrators Are 
Granted to Arbitral Immunity for Their Actions. 
In Olsen v. National Assoc. of Securities Dealers, 73 an employee 
brought arbitration proceedings against his employer. A panel of arbitra-
tors sponsored by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
held against the employee in his age discrimination action against the em-
ployer. After the award, the ex-employee learned that one of the arbitrators 
had a continuing business relationship with the employer. The employee 
brought suit in the federal district court to vacate the adverse award. The 
district court declined, however, the court of appeals vacated the award on 
the grounds of evident partiality. 
The ex-employee then brought suit for damages against the NASD 
alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent pro-
cessing of arbitration, gross negligence, breach of warranty, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The employee also sued the ap-
pointed arbitrator. 
72 !d. at 136. 
n ss F3d 381 (8'" Cir. 1996). 
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In accordance with prior authority, the court of appeals held that the 
arbitrators and the agency that appointed them were immune from suit for 
damages, even when it is alleged that the appointing authority violated its 
own rules in making the appointment.74 
The court justified its decision by stating: 
Like judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, arbitral immunity is nec-
essary to protect decisionmakers from undue influence, and the decision-
making process from attack by dissatisfied litigants .... The courts also 
agree that to give effect to these underlying policies, arbitral immunity 
extends beyond arbitrators themselves to organizations that sponsor arbi-
trations .... Without this extension, arbitral immunity would be almost 
meaningless because liability would simply be shifted from individual 
arbitrators to the sponsoring organizations .... Arbitral immunity pro-
tects all acts within the scope of the arbitral process .... Olson argues 
the NASD's appointment of Hentges was not within the scope of the ar-
bitral process because it occurred before the decision-making process 
began. The appointment of arbitrators is a necessary part of arbitration 
administration, however, and thus is protected by arbitral immunity. 
Olson also asserts arbitral immunity does not apply because the appoint-
ment of Hentges violated the NASD's own rules. We reject this conten-
tion as well. A sponsoring organization is immune from civil liability for 
improperly selecting an arbitration panel, even when the selection vio-
lates the organization's own rules 75 
It is true that the justice system has to protect judges and arbitrators 
from claims for damages for official conduct, but here both the arbitrator 
and appointing authority failed to act properly, and the victim was denied 
any recovery of attorneys fees incurred, lost-time damages, etc. Surely, it is 
possible to devise plans to protect the arbitrators and give some remedial 
relief to the parties harmed by these errors. If there are no sanctions for 
misconduct, what incentives are there for proper conduct? 
L. Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act Provides That a Court 
May Vacate an Arbitration Award "Where There Is Evident Partiality . .. 
in the Arbitrators." Evident Partiality Has Been Found in Non-disclosure 
Cases and Actual Bias Cases. 
As indicated in the discussion of the prior case, if an arbitrator has 
some hidden relationship with one of the parties, he or she has a duty to 
disclose this fact to the parties prior to hearing the claim. A failure to dis-
close creates an impression of bias, sufficient to enable a court to vacate an 
74. !d. 
75. !d. at 382. 
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award and to order a new arbitration. The protesting party does not have 
any burden to prove bias; it is inferred from the non-disclosure. 
On the other hand, an allegation of actual bias places the burden of 
proving the actual bias upon the protesting party. 76 
M. Third-party Beneficiaries of Contracts Which Contain Arbitration 
Clauses May Insist upon Exercising the Right to Arbitration. 
In Speur, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central L~fe Assurance Co., 77 Goodman, 
a commodities broker in New York, had over 80 trading accounts for hi'> 
customers with Spear, Leeds of New York. Spear, Leeds would issue 
monthly reports on these accounts with much of the information furnished 
by Goodman. Goodman took out life insurance policies on his life payable 
to a trust for the benefit of his customers. The purpose was to facilitate 
payment to his customers in the event of his death. 
Much of the information about the Goodman accounts was fictitious, 
and the New York Stock Exchange brought proceedings against Goodman. 
Goodman died, and the insurance companies paid the life insurance pro-
ceeds to Goodman's account holders. The actual credits in the accounts 
amounted to approximately two million dollars, while the life insurance 
proceeds amounted to approximately twenty million dollars. Thus, the ac-
count holders allegedly received a large windfall. 
The insurance companies brought arbitration proceedings against 
Spear, Leeds for its negligence in maintaining the accounts, records, etc. 
Spears, Leeds then filed suit in federal court to enjoin the arbitration. The 
district court found that there was no arbitration contract between the in-
surance companies and Spear, Leeds.78 
The insurance companies appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The court agreed with the district court that there was no arbitration 
contract between Spear, Leeds and the insurance companies; however, the 
court noted that Spear was a member of the New York Stock Exchange, 
which provides in its Constitution that "any controversy between a mem-
ber . . . and any other person arising out of the business of such 
member ... shall, at the instance of any such party be submitted for arbitra-
tion. "79 
In addition Rule 600(a) of the NYSE Arbitration Rules further states: 
"Any dispute, claim or controversy between a ... non-member and a 
member . . arising in connection with the business of such member ... 
76. Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp .. 78 F.3d 424 (9'" Ctr. 1996) 
77 85 F.3d 21 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
78. Id. at 26. 
79. Id. 
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shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of the [NYSE] as pro-
vided by any duly executed and enforceable written agreement or upon the 
demand of the ... non-member. "80 
The court held, in light of the stock exchange rules, the contract be-
tween the exchange and its members creates a third-party-beneficiary con-
tract in favor of any person who made demands against a member. 
Judge Pollack, in a penetrating dissent stated (in part): 
We are asked to compel a member of the NYSE to arbitrate a possi-
ble tort claim asserted by life Insurers which wrote life insurance on the 
life of one, Goodman, a customer of SLK, as part of his estate planning, 
for the benefit of Goodman's customers, payable to a trust for their ben-
efit. The Insurers had no contact or business of any kind with SLK and 
made no inquiries of SLK. The Insurers wrote the life policies for, and 
dealt with Goodman, but never transacted any business with SLK. By 
virtue of joining the NYSE, SLK agreed to arbitrate only the business 
claims of any person who asserted a claim against SLK in connection 
with some business conducted by or with SLK by that person. 
SLK never came in contact with the Insurers/appellants, never made 
any representations to the latter, never sent any documents or communi-
cations whatsoever to appellants, and had no knowledge of the dealings 
of Goodman resulting in the life insurance .... 81 
It is to be noted that the judges did not disagree that the arbitration 
rights may be asserted by third-party beneficiaries; the judges disagreed as 
to whether the facts of this case indicate the existence of a third-party ben-
eficiary contract. The majority opinion seemingly reflects the liberal New 
York view favoring the third-party beneficiary contract concept. 82 
N. An Arbitration Clause, Which Incorporates by Reference the Laws of 
a Particular State, Forbidding Arbitrators from Awarding Attorney's 
Fees and Punitive Damages, Might Not Be Effective to Exclude These 
Types of Awards. 
In PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk,83 the parties had entered into a client 
agreement which contained the following: 
• Arbitration is final and binding on the parties. 
• The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, includ-
ing the right to jury trial. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. at 32. 
82. L P. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 242-243 (2d ed. 1965). 
83. 81 F.3d 1193 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
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I agree, and by carrying an account for me Paine Webber agrees, that 
any and all controversies which may arise between me and Paine Webber 
concerning any account, transaction, dispute or the construction, perfor-
mance, or breach of this or any other agreement, whether entered into 
prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof, shall be determined by arbi-
tration. Any arbitration under this agreement shall be held under and 
pursuant to and be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and shall be 
conducted before an arbitration panel convened by the New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc., or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. I 
may also select any other national securities exchange's arbitration fo-
rum upon which Paine Webber is legally required to arbitrate the contro-
versies with me, including, where applicable, the Municipal Securities 
Rule Making Board. Such arbitration shall be governed by the rules of 
the organization convening the panel. ... The award of the arbitrators, 
or of the majority of them, shall be final, and judgment upon the award 
rendered may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
"This agreement and its enforcement shall be construed and gov-
erned by the law of the State of New York." PaineWebber drafted the 
Agreement.84 
329 
Mr. and Mrs. Bybyk filed claims against PaineWebber with the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers claiming that Paine Webber did not 
properly supervise their account, and that it breached fiduciary duties. The 
Bybyks requested arbitration, and PaineWebber went to court to stay the 
arbitration on the grounds that the six-year period for making claims had 
run on some of the claims and to prevent the Bybyks from seeking attor-
neys' fees and punitive damages. The federal district court dismissed 
Paine Webber's complaint, and PaineWebber appealed. 
The court held that the broad wording of the submission to arbitration 
clause would give the arbitrators power to decide "any and all controver-
sies" including the six-year time limitation, the award of attorneys' fees 
and punitive damages. 
In dissent, Judge Graafeiland stated that the words "and its enforce-
ment" in the choice-of-law clause made it obvious to him that the question 
of the time limitation would have to be first submitted to the courts for de-
termination and not to the arbitration panel. The dissent did not seem to 
quarrel with the majority opinion regarding the award of attorneys' fees 
and punitive damages. 85 
Query: How would the appellate court hold if the case was submitted 
to arbitration, and the arbitrators chose to uphold the claims in spite of the 
84. !d. at 1196. 
85. !d. at 1202. 
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six-year limitation period provided for in the NASD Rules? Would this be 
a manifest disregard of the law? 
The above decision should be compared with the similar case of 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 86 A customer filed suit in 
the federal district court against his stockbroker alleging mishandling of 
the account. The broker asserted that the brokerage agreement provided for 
arbitration under the rules of the National Association of Securities Bro-
kers (NASD), and that the agreement chose the law of New York for its 
governance. 
The district court agreed with the brokerage house and ordered arbitra-
tion. The arbitrators awarded punitive damages to the customers, and the 
brokerage house asserted, upon moving to vacate the punitive award in the 
district court, that New York case law did not allow arbitrators to award 
punitive damages; only New York courts could make this kind of an 
award. The federal district court and the court of appeals agreed with this 
view and vacated the award. The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari because the courts of appeal had split on the question as to 
whether a choice of law clause can be construed to rule out the awarding 
of punitive damage awards by arbitrators. 
The court noted that the brokerage agreement did not expressly ex-
clude the awarding of punitive damages by arbitrators, and an alleged im-
plied exclusion was ambiguous with the result that the contract was to be 
construed against the drafter - the brokerage house. The court then stated 
that the rules of the NASD provide that "the arbitrators may award dam-
ages and other relief."87 Finally, the NASD supplies arbitrators with manu-
als that expressly provide for punitive damages. It should be noted that 
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, fairly demolished this "manual approach." 
The result in this case may be commendable, but the reasoning is quite 
weak. 
0. A Broad Arbitration Clause Which States That it Covers "Any Dis-
pute Between Any of the Parties Which May Arise Hereunder" 
May Cover Tort Claims. 
In H.S. Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 88 controlling stockhold-
ers sold their stock to others, and the sales agreement provided that the 
sales price would be dictated by the net profits of the corporation over a 
five-year period after the sale. Allegedly the buyers did not use their best 
efforts to earn significant profits, and the sellers brought arbitration pro-
86 115 SCt 1212 (1995) 
87. !d. at 1218. 
88. 83 F.3d 3X2 (! lth Cir. 1996). 
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ceedings alleging that the buyers were guilty of the torts of fraud, fraudu-
lent inducement, deceit, misrepresentation, conversion, breach of good 
faith and fair dealing, and outrage. The district court held that the tort 
claims did not arise "hereunder the contract." The court of appeals re-
versed holding that all of these tort claims arose under the alleged non-per-
formance of the sales contract and were subject to arbitration.89 
P. In Drafting Choice of Law Clauses in Arbitration Agreements, Law-
yers Should Know the Law Governing the Time Limitations in Requesting 
Arbitration in the Chosen State. 
In Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 90 Pennsylvania residents and former 
shareholders of a Pennsylvania corporation merged with a Delaware cor-
poration whose principal place of business was in Connecticut. In the 
merger agreement, the parties chose to be governed by the "internal laws 
of the state of Connecticut."91 
The merger agreement called for arbitration in the event of disputes 
between the parties. Disputes arose, and the complaining party demanded 
arbitration. The arbitration was held, and the aggrieved party waited more 
than thirty days to file suit to vacate the award, when Connecticut law re-
quired the suit to be filed within 30 days. The suit was filed within the 90-
day period provided in the Federal Arbitration Act. The court held that the 
Connecticut statute was jurisdictional and that it was not pre-empted by 
the FAA limitation period. The court of appeals affirmed by holding that 
the shorter limitation period in Connecticut law does not conflict with the 
FAA's "primary purpose" and is not preempted by it. 92 
Q. When an Arbitration Clause Names Only One Appointing Organiza-
tion and That Organization Refuses to Appoint Arbitrators, a Court May 
Decline to Step in and Appoint Arbitrators and the Parties May Be 
Forced to Litigate. 
In In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders Derivative Litigation v. 
Gutfreund, 91 shareholders in a stock brokerage firm brought stockholders' 
derivative actions against some officers of the firm. The officers had previ-
ously signed employment contracts with the brokerage firm submitting all 
disputes to arbitration with the arbitrators to be appointed by the New 
York Securities Exchange. The Exchange declined to make any appoint-
89. /d. 
90. 68 F. 3d 1391 (DC Cir. 1995). 
91 /d. at 139:1. 
92. !d. at 1396. 
93. 68 F.3d 554 (2nd Cir. 1995) 
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ment of arbitrators on the grounds that arbitration was not appropriately 
within the mandatory provisions of the NYSE Constitution and that the 
type of litigation was foreign to the procedures employed by the NYSE. 
The defendants asserted that Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
provided for the appointment of arbitrators by the federal district court: 
If in the agreement provision to be made for a method of naming or 
appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be 
followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be pro-
vided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or 
if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitra-
tor or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the appli-
cation of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and 
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, 
who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as 
if he or they had been specifically named therein.94 
The court refused to apply the "lapse" language in Section 5 to cover a 
refusal to appoint by the exclusive appointing authority. The court noted 
that district court cases cited by the parties had used Section 5 in appoint-
ing substitute arbitrators, but that none of the cases involved this kind of a 
factual setting in which there was a choice of an exclusive appointing or-
ganization. 
R. The Federal Arbitration Act Covers "A Contract Evidencing a Trans-
action Involving Commerce;" These Words Reach to the Limits of Con-
gress' Commerce Clause Power. 
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. Inc. v. Dobson, 95 An Alabama couple 
contracted with a termite exterminator to exterminate in their home. The 
exterminator sprayed the home and gave the couple a warranty regarding 
the absence of termites. The couple later sold their home, and the new 
owners encountered swarms of termites. The new owners sued the sellers 
who interpleaded the termite company on its warranty. The termite com-
pany requested arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the original 
contract. The Alabama trial court and Alabama Supreme Court invalidated 
the arbitration clause on the ground that an Alabama statue invalidated 
predispute arbitration clauses in contracts, and that the Federal Arbitration 
Act did not cover this transaction because the parties did not "contem-
plate" substantial interstate commerce. The United States Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case. 
94. !d. at 560. 
95. 115 s Ct. 834 (1995) 
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The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the "contemplation test" 
used by the Alabama Court. The court held that the word "involving" 
should be treated the same as the word "affecting" interstate commerce, 
and that these words reach to the limits of Congress' commerce clause 
powers. The one concurring decision and two dissenting opinions ex-
pressed the views that the FAA was never intended to cover state arbitra-
tion cases, and they opined that the Court should overrule prior case law to 
this effect. 96 
S. State Law Which Attempts to Regulate Specifically and Solely Arbitra-
tion Contracts Conflicts with Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and 
Is Preempted by Federal Law. 
In Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 97 a dispute arose between a Sub-
way restaurant franchisee and franchisor, and the franchisee filed suit in 
Montana state court. The Montana court stayed the suit pending arbitration 
in accordance with an arbitration clause in the franchise contract. The 
Montana Supreme Court vacated the stay on the ground that the arbitration 
clause did not follow Montana law, which required that every arbitration 
contract contain language that "notice that a contract is subject to arbitra-
tion be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the con-
tract."98 The Montana Supreme Court held against arbitration. The franchi-
sees argued that the Montana statute was invalidated by section 2 of the 
FAA, but the court refused to adopt this view. 
The franchisees appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The 
Court reversed the Montana judgment and remanded the case. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court upon remand persisted in its view, and "[o]n remand, 
without inviting or permitting further briefing or oral argument,"99 the 
Montana court followed its original ruling. Certiorari was again granted, 
and the United States Supreme Court overruled the Montana Supreme 
Court and again ruled that: 
Applying § 27-5-114( 4) here, in contrast, would not enforce the ar-
bitration clause in the contract between DAI and Casarotto; instead, 
Montana's first-page notice requirement would invalidate the clause. 
The "goals and policies" of the FAA, this Court's precedent indicates, 
are antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on 
arbitration provisions. Section 2 "mandate[s] the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements," Southland, 465 U.S., at 10, 104 S.Ct., at 858, "save 
96. /d. 
97. 116 S.Ct. 1652 (!996). 
98. /d. 
99. /d. at 1655. 
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upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract," 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 27-5-114(4) of Montana's law places 
arbitration agreements in a class apart from "any contract," and singu-
larly limits their validity. The State's prescription is thus inconsonant 
with, and is therefore preempted by, the federallaw. 100 
It is wondered what would be the result if this Montana statute were 
amended to add a long laundry list of contractual prohibitions or require-
ments along with arbitration which would have to be listed on the front 
page of the contracts? The court seemed to stress that this statute "specifi-
cally and solely" singled out arbitration as the fatal step. Of course, a court 
could find some other reason why the federal act should preempt the state 
law. 
T. A Contract (Containing an Arbitration Clause) Between Two Domes-
tic Corporations Dealing with Performance in a Foreign Country and 
Which Is Arbitrated in the United States May Be Enforced in a Federal 
Court in the United States. 
In Lander Co. v. MMP Investments, Inc., 101 two domestic corporations 
contracted with each other to manufacture goods in the United States for 
export to Poland by the distributing corporation. The sales contract had an 
arbitration clause providing for arbitration in New York under the arbitra-
tion rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. These rules provide 
for binding arbitration and a waiver. 
Arbitration proceedings were held in New York, and the manufactur-
ing corporation was awarded more than $500,000 plus interest. The win-
ner sought to enforce the award in federal district court. The federal dis-
trict court dismissed the suit on the basis that the New York Convention 
did not apply to this arbitration contract. The manufacturer appealed and 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the words that the Conven-
tion will be enforced "on the basis of reciprocity [to] declare that it will 
apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of award only in 
the territory of another Contracting State" did not restrict the enforcement 
to awards made only in another Contracting State, but the words should be 
interpreted to mean: 
that the United States will enforce pursuant to the Convention only arbi-
tral awards made in nations that also adhere to the Convention. This is 
the significance of the reference to reciprocity. The United States will 
not enforce an arbitration award made in a country that, by failing to 
100. !d. at 1657. 
I 0 I I 07 F. 3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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adopt the Convention, has not committed itself to enforce arbitration 
awards made in the United States. Granted, "a Contracting State" would 
be clearer, but "another Contracting State" is clear enough in context; it 
means ··another signatory of the Convention, like the United States, as 
opposed to nonsignatories. 102 
335 
In addition, the court held that the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards would not preclude the federal 
district court's jurisdiction to apply the Federal Arbitration Act under di-
versity of citizenship jurisdiction. 
U. A Non-signatory to an Arbitration Agreement May Suffer a Default by 
an Arbitrator and Then Later Attack the Award Collaterally When the 
Winner Seeks to Enforce the Award. The Collateral Attack Is Not Bound 
hy the Three Month Period in Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon Industries, Inc., 101 a tele-
phone carrier, seeking to enforce an arbitration clause against a commer-
cial customer over a payment dispute. The arbitration agreement was not 
signed by the customer. The arbitrator entered a default award against the 
customer. The customer sought to vacate the award on the ground that it 
did not sign the agreement and the carrier's claim was asserted long after 
the expiration of the three-month period in Section 4 of the FAA. The dis-
trict court confirmed the award, and the customer appealed. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a case of first impression, 
that the customer was not bound by the default award because it was a 
non-signatory to the arbitration agreement and the three-month period had 
run. The court further held that if the customer did not take part in the arbi-
tration, then the duty was on the telephone carrier under Section 12 to en-
list the aid of the district court to issue an order compelling arbitration, and 
that if the customer did not appear, the district court had jurisdiction to 
enter a defau It judgment against the customer. 104 
V. The "Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure," Established under 
the Motor Vehicle Lemon Law in Some States and under the Magnuson-
moss Warranty Act, Might Not Be Deemed "Arbitration" under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. 
I 02. !d. at 482. 
I 03. 138 F. 3d 426 (I st Cir 1998) 
104. !d. 
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In Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 105 a car buyer sued a car 
manufacturer for breach of warranty. The manufacturer moved to dismiss 
because the buyer had not used the alternative dispute resolution procedure 
established under the Pennsylvania "lemon law" and Magnuson-Moss Act. 
The federal district court denied the motion, and the manufacturer ap-
pealed. 
The court of appeals held that the term arbitration as used in the FAA 
does not encompass the notion found in the lemon law and Magnuson-
Moss Act, because there is little expectation that a hearing before a panel 
will settle or conclude the controversy between the buyer and manufacturer 
of the car. Further, the court noted, that if the drafters intended arbitration, 
then they would have explicitly used the term. As a result, there was no 
denial of the use of arbitration, and the district court (and the appeals 
court) had no jurisdiction over the matter. 106 
W. Under New York Law, an Unconfirmed Appraisal Award Made by a 
Judicial Umpire May Have Res Judicata Effect Between the Same Parties 
in Any Future Litigation. 
In Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 107 a homeowner sued an in-
surance company for losses allegedly caused by a negligent housepainter. 
A New York court appointed an umpire who took testimony and made an 
appraisal of loss under the homeowner's insurance policy which required 
this procedure. The umpire made findings of fact and law and the insur-
ance company made payment under the appraisal. Later, the homeowner 
sued the insurance company, which asserted a res judicata defense. The 
homeowner asserted that the umpire's appraisal had not been confirmed by 
any court. The federal district court dismissed the lawsuit on res judicata 
grounds, and the federal court of appeals affirmed. 
The federal court of appeals had to make an "Erie guess" as to how the 
highest court of New York would rule. The court predicted that New 
York's highest court would hold that an unconfirmed arbitrator's award or 
an unconfirmed judicial umpire's appraisal would be held res judicata for 
all issues that were raised or could have been raised under the first award 
despite the fact the insured stipulated with the insurance company that the 
insured was not giving up certain delineated claims in any future action. 
(i.e., the New York "transactional approach to res judicata, barring a later 
claim arising out of the same factual grouping as an earlier litigated claim 
105. Ill F.3d 343 (3"1 Cir. 1997). 
106. !d. 
107. Ill F.3d 261(2nd Cir. 1997). 
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even if the later claim is based on different legal theories or seeks dissimi-
lar or additional relief.") 108 
X. Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act are Deemed to Be 
Permissive and Not Mandatory as to Venue of Suits Confirming and Va-
catinf? Awards. 
In Sutter Corp. v. P&P Industries, Inc., 109 arbitration proceedings were 
conducted in Dallas, Texas. The losing party moved to vacate the award in 
a federal district court in Oklahoma. Still later, the winning party filed suit 
in the federal district court in Texas to confirm the award. Section 9 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act provides that an action for confirmation "may be 
made to the United States court in and for the district within which such 
award was made." Section I 0 of the FAA states that "the United States 
court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an or-
der vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Sections 9 and I 0 are per-
missive venue provisions, and that either the Texas or Oklahoma courts 
would have jurisdiction; the court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the language of Section 10 is mandatory, not permissive. 
Finally, the court held that under the "first to file rule," the Oklahoma 
court should hear the motion, and the Texas court should have transferred 
the action to the Oklahoma court. 110 
Y. In Spite of a Franchise Agreement's Choice of New York Law as Gov-
erning the Agreement, Arbitrators Might Not Be Bound to Apply New 
York Law, Which Forbids the Introduction of Evidence Showing That 
One Party Offered to Settle. 
In Gallus Investments, L.P. v. Pudgie's Famous Chicken, Ltd., 111 a 
franchisor and franchisee signed a franchise agreement which provided for 
arbitration of any "dispute with respect to either this Agreement or the ade-
quacy of either party's performance thereunder" and that "arbitration shall 
108. !d. at 265. 
109. 125 F3d 914 (5'" Cir. 1997) 
110. /d. Note: The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has very recently held that Section Nine 
of the FAA confers pcnnissive rather than mandatory ven~.;e upon district courts in the district court 
in which an arbitration award has been made. Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc v U.S. Supply Co. Inc., 
142 F3d 188 (4'" Cir. 1998) 
111. 134 F3d 231 (4'" Cir 1998). 
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be conducted in accordance with the rules promulgated by the American 
Arbitration Association."112 
Rule 31 of the AAA provided that "[t]he parties ... shall produce 
such evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding 
and determination of the dispute, and that [t]he arbitrator shall be the judge 
of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered, and conformity to 
legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary." 
During the hearings, the franchisee introduced into evidence letters 
which contained settlement offers sent by the franchisor's attorneys. The 
franchisor objected, and the arbitration panel of three lawyers overruled. 
The franchisor submitted that New York law does not permit the intro-
duction of settlement efforts in trials and appealed to the federal district 
court. The court affirmed the award which was an amount over twice the 
sum mentioned in the offers of settlement. The franchisor contended that 
the arbitrators committed error in their receiving and considering the evi-
dence. The court of appeals disagreed stating: 
However, to force the panel to apply New York's (or any other) eviden-
tiary rules would be to reject the parties' agreement that legal eviden-
tiary rules need not be followed. Fortunately, there is no necessary con-
flict between the choice-of-law provision and the arbitration clause. The 
two clauses can easily be reconciled if interpreted to mean that New 
York law governs the parties' contractual rights and duties, and that the 
panel is free not to apply legal rules of evidence from any jurisdiction, 
New York or elsewhere. Such a reading gives effect to the arbitration 
clause while in no way undermining the choice-of-law provision. 113 
The appeals comt held that the consideration of this evidence did not 
deprive the franchisor of "fundamental fairness" and "due process." 
Rather, this evidence was considered in regard to the efforts of the franchi-
see to mitigate damages. It would appear that the franchisor was flirting 
with the notion of "manifest disregard of the law," but never clearly 
stressed it. 
It might be wise to draft a more precise arbitration clause such as: "all 
the substantive procedural and evidentiary law of New York is being 
adopted by the agreement." 
Z. Under a Broad Arbitration Clause, (E.g., "Any Dispute, Controversy. 
or Claims Arising under or in Connection with this Agreement") a Claim 
by an Employee That He Was Discharged from His Employment Because 
He Was a Whistle-blower under the FIRREA, Is Subject to Arbitration. 
112. /d. at 232. 
113 /d. at 233. 
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In Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, FSP, 114 Oldroyd was a vice-presi-
dent and director of Management Information Systems at a bank. He 
learned that the head of the Consumer Loan Department had been making 
a series of illegal loans, and he informed senior bank officials of these acts. 
Allegedly, Oldroyd was told to "keep quiet" about these loans. Oldroyd 
told the U.S. Treasury Department of Thrift Supervision about these illegal 
loans. Subsequently, the loan officer was prosecuted and convicted. 115 
Oldroyd was demoted and eventually discharged. Oldroyd claimed 
that he suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of harassment received 
because he was a "whistle-blower." Oldroyd brought suit for retaliatory 
discharge and breach of his employment contract. The district court held 
that the retaliatory discharge claim could not be arbitrated under the arbi-
tration clause in Oldroyd's employment contract. The bank appealed to the 
court of appeals. 
The court of appeals held that the words "[a]ny dispute, controversy or 
claim arising under or in connection with this Agreement shall be settled 
exclusively by arbitration, conducted before a Panel of three (3) arbitrators 
in Elmira, New York, in accordance with the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association then in effect" constitute a broad arbitration clause 
"that justifies a presumption of arbitrability." 116 Oldroyd failed to over-
come this presumption. Further, Oldroyd's contention, that Congress did 
not intend his claim to be subject to arbitration, was not established. 
AA. Consumers Who Order Goods by Telephone, Mail, or the Internet, 
must Read the Paperwork Which Accompanies the Delivered Goods or 
They May Be Subject to an Arbitration Clause Contained in the Paper-
work. 
In Hill v.Gateway 2000, Inc., 117 a couple used the telephone to order a 
new computer. They paid for the computer with a credit card. Later, a box 
arrived containing the computer and accompanying paperwork. The paper-
work contained a warranty and a clause stating that the retention of the 
computer without protest for thirty days constitutes an acceptance of the 
terms, which include mandatory arbitration. The couple did not complain 
within thirty days. They later sued the manufacturer for alleged RICO vio-
lations, and the company demanded arbitration. 
114 134 F.3d 72 (2nd. Cir. 1998) 
115. /d. a1 74. 
116. /d. at 76. 
117. 105 F.3d 1147 (7'" Cir. 1997). 
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The federal district court refused to order arbitration, because of the 
view that the present record "is insufficient to support a finding of a valid 
arbitration agreement between the parties or that the plaintiffs were given 
adequate notice of the arbitration agreement."118 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was 
no need for the written paperwork to be in conspicuous print, and that the 
buyers, by retaining possession without written complaint within the thirty-
day period, were bound by the arbitration clause. The court pointed out 
that the buyers were not informed, in advance of the sale, of the terms of 
the warranty. Judge Easterbrook was careful to note the reasons for his 
decision: 
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air 
transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical consider-
ations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their 
products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to cus-
tomers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone 
for direct-sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-page 
statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the 
droning voices would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential 
buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And 
oral recitation would not avoid customers' assertions (whether true or 
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not 
remember or understand it. Writing provides benefits for both sides of 
commercial transactions. Customers as a group are better off when ven-
dors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and 
use instead a simple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are 
bound by such documents, read or unread. 119 
BB. Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act Requires the Consent of 
Both Parties Before a District Court Can Confirm the Award While Sec-
tion 207 of the Recognition of Foreign Arbitration Awards Merely Re-
quires the Consent of One Party; Which Provision Applies to a Foreign 
Arbitration? 
In McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 120 Lloyds 
of London issued an insurance policy in London insuring property located 
in Louisiana. The policy was physically delivered in London to an agent of 
the insured. Eventually, a photocopy of the policy was mailed to the in-
sured in Louisiana. The insured property was damaged, and Lloyds denied 
liability under the policy. Lloyds instituted arbitration proceedings in Lon-
118. /d. at 1148. 
119. /d. at 1149. 
120. 120 F.3d 583 (5'" Cir. 1997). 
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don before a panel of three arbitrators. Both parties took part in the pro-
ceedings, although the insured denied that the panel had jurisdiction be-
cause Louisiana invalidates arbitration clauses inserted into policies of in-
surance which are delivered in Louisiana. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since this policy was not 
"delivered" in Louisiana, the Louisiana statute did not apply. The court 
then held that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for 
confirmation of the award. The insured cited Section 9 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, which provides that both parties must consent to the judicial 
confirmation of the award. Lloyds cited Section 207 of the Recognition of 
Foreign Arbitration Convention, which provides that "any party to the ar-
bitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter ... 
for an order confirming the award ... unless it finds ... grounds for re-
fusal or deferral ... in the said Convention."121 
The circuit court held that: 
Because we have held that the Convention applies to this case, the en-
forcement provision of the Convention necessarily applies unless §9 of 
the FAA docs not conflict with the Convention. Section 9 clearly docs so 
conflict, so we decline to apply §9's consent to confirmation provision 
to the arbitration agreement between McDermott and Lloyds. 122 
It is wondered whether the attorneys for Lloyds' examined the law of 
Louisiana prior to the mailing of the policy of insurance to London and 
sending a photocopy to Louisiana; or were they unaware of this quirk in 
the law and just incredibly fortunate? 
CC. What Does the Phrase, "Disputes Involving the Insurance Busi-
ness," in the NASD Code, Mean? 
In In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practice Litigation All 
Agent Actions v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 123 former employees of an 
insurance company sued the company for alleged retaliation against them 
for their refusal to take part in the insurance company's alleged sales 
frauds. The company sought arbitration based on the employees having 
signed Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Trans-
fer Forms, which adopted the arbitration provisions of the NASD Code. 
Part 1 Section i of the Code articulates what matters are eligible for arbitra-
tion: 
121. /d.at588. 
122. /d. 
123. 133 F3d 225 (3rd Cir. 1998) 
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[A]ny dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with 
the business of any member of the [NASD], or arising out of the employ-
ment or termination of employment of associated person(s) with any 
member, with the exception of disputes involving the insurance business 
of any member which is also an insurance company. 124 
The court analyzed the history of the phrase, "dispute involving the 
insurance business," and the various ways of defining the words and con-
cluded that: 
We ultimately cannot say with positive assurance that the language 
of Form U-4 and the NASD Code, as well as their drafting histories, in-
dicate the parties' desire not to arbitrate employment disputes that re-
quire the resolution of an insurance business issue. There is only one 
clear expression of intent here - that employment disputes are subject 
to arbitration while "intrinsically insurance" claims arc not. Because this 
court cannot say with certainty what is meant by "intrinsically insurance" 
claims, and whether it embraces employment disputes, our mandate is 
clear: a presumption in favor of arbitration applies and doubts in con-
struction are resolved against the resisting parties. Thus, we will reverse 
the district court's ruling that the insurance business exception exempted 
the plaintiff's claims from arbitration in this case. 125 
The court also held that although the insurance company was not a 
signatory to any written agreement with the employees involving the adop-
tion of the arbitration process, it was a third party beneficiary of the con-
tract between the employees and the NASD. 
DD. If the Agreement to Arbitrate Fails to Clearly Indicate Who Has 
Jurisdiction to Determine the Arbitrability of a Dispute , ( the Courts or 
the Arbitrators)- Then Who Decides? 
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 126 stockholders in a small 
corporation did not sign an arbitration contract with a third party. The third 
party claimed arbitration between itself, the small corporation, and the two 
stockholders. The two stockholders denied that arbitration bound them, 
and the arbitrators held that they were bound to arbitrate with the third per-
son. The district court confirmed the award and the two stockholders ap-
pealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the two 
stockholders and vacated the award because it was not subject to arbitra-
124. !d. at 228. 
125. !d. at 234. 
126. 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995) 
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tion. The third party petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certio-
rari, which was granted. 
The Supreme Court held that if parties agree to arbitrate the 
arbitrability of a question, the court's standard of review is the same for 
arbitrability as any other matter the parties agreed to arbitrate. If the parties 
did not agree to arbitrate the question of arbitrability, the court should de-
cide the question of arbitrability by looking at principles of contract forma-
tion. The reviewing court should not assume the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is clear evidence that they did so. 127 
EE. Why Do Some Employers Persist in the Use of Invalid Arbitration 
Clauses in Employment Contracts? 
In Paladino v. A vnet Computer Tech., Inc., 128 a women was employed 
by a company as a sales consultant. When she was hired she signed a 
handbook acknowledgment form. The handbook contained a copy of the 
following consent to arbitration: 
IMPORT ANT NOTICE: READ 
THIS CAREFULLY 
CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 
I recognize that during the course of my employment differences 
can arise between the Company and me. To that end, the Company and I 
consent to the settlement by arbitration of any controversy or claim 
arising out of or relating to my employment or the termination of my 
employment. Arbitration shall be in accordance with the commercial 
rules of the American Arbitration Association before a panel of three 
arbitrators in or near the city where I am principally employed. The 
Company and I further consent to the jurisdiction of the highest court of 
original jurisdiction of the state where I am principally employed, and of 
the United States District Court in the District where the arbitration takes 
place, for all purposes in connection with the arbitration, including the 
entry of judgment on any award. The arbitrator is authorized to award 
damages for breach of contract only, and shall have no authority what-
soever to make an award of other damages. 129 
The court noted that the print for this arbitration clause was in smaller 
type than other print in the handbook. Approximately fifteen months after 
she was hired, she was fired and she brought suit against the employer for 
127. /d. at 125. 
128. 134 F 3d 1054 (11'1' Cir. 1998). 
129. /d. at 1056. 
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violations of Title VII, a Florida anti-discrimination statute, and Florida's 
common law. The employer made a motion in the federal district court to 
stay the action, pending arbitration. The federal district court denied the 
motion without opinion, and the employer appealed to the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
A three-judge panel agreed with the district court's refusal to stay the 
lawsuit pending arbitration, but the judges disagreed on their reasoning. 
Chief Judge Hatchett held, in a very murky opinion, that the last italicized 
clause in the above arbitration agreement "completely proscribes an arbi-
tral award of Title VII damages." 130 It contained that this is fundamentally 
at odds with the purpose of Title VII ... therefore, "[g]iven the deficien-
cies and limited nature of this arbitration agreement, the district court 
properly declined to compel arbitration of the employee's lawsuit." 131 
Judges Cox and Tjoflat agreed that the actions of the district court 
were proper, but added, "we disagree that the arbitration clause at issue 
excludes Title VII claims. We hold rather that the clause includes Title 
VII, but that (as Chief Judge Hatchett observes) it deprives the employee 
of any prospect for meaningful relief and is therefore unenforceable." 132 
Judge Hatchett's opinion pointed out that the employer had used the 
quoted arbitration agreement in another case, and that a federal district 
court had refused to compel arbitration because of the restriction on dam-
ages under Title VII. In fact, in the instant case, the attorney for the em-
ployer implored the court to invalidate the offending clause! Why do em-
ployers persist in the use of invalid clauses? 
FF. In the View of Two Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Words in an Arbi-
tration Contract That Any Award Is to Be Deemed "Final, Binding, and 
Conclusive," Are Not Sufficient to Give a Federal District Court Juris-
diction to Confirm the Award. 
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that a party may ap-
ply to the court for confirmation of an arbitration award only "[i]f the par-
ties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be 
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration." In PVI, Inc. v. 
Ratiopharm GMBH, 133 a contract provided that certain questions would be 
referred to a neutral individual for decision. The contract provided that this 
decision would be "final, binding and conclusive." 134 
130. !d. at I 060. 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. 135 F3d 1252 (8'" Cir. 1998) 
134. !d. at 1253 
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The neutral party found in favor of the party who petitioned the federal 
district court to confirm the decision. The contract was silent as to the con-
firmation process. The district court denied confirmation, and the losing 
party appealed. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on the 
ground that Section 9's language clearly states that only if the parties have 
agreed to the federal court's confirmation process, does the court have ju-
risdiction to confirm the award. The court noted that the Seventh and Sec-
ond Circuits had found that the "final, binding and conclusive" language 
was enough to show that the parties consented to federal district court con-
firmation. However, the Tenth Circuit held that these words did not give 
federal courts power to confirm. The Eighth Circuit expressly followed the 
Tenth Circuit. The court expressed the view that perhaps state courts could 
confirm the award. 135 
Attorneys should comply with the Federal Arbitration Act by stating in 
arbitration agreements that any award should be confirmed by the federal 
courts. 
GG. If a Motion to Compel Arbitration Is "Embedded" in a Substantive 
Suit, Then the Federal District's Decision to Compel Arbitration on Some 
or All of the Claims Before it Is Not Considered to Be a Final Decision 
and Is Not Reviewable in Some of the Federal Courts. 
In McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 136 a number of senior citizens took 
out reverse mortgages with the Providential Corporation. These senior citi-
zens sued Providential for Truth in Lending Act violations, fraud, etc., un-
der state law. The senior citizens sought a class-action lawsuit, and Provi-
dential sought to compel arbitration in accordance with arbitration clauses 
contained in the reverse mortgages. The district court ordered the plaintiffs 
to submit to arbitration, and they appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
The court of appeals cited and quoted from a relatively recent prior 
case: 
[I]f the motion to compel arbitration in a given case is the only claim 
before the district court, a decision to compel arbitration is deemed to 
dispose of the entire case, and permit appellate review under 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(3) ... On the other hand, if the motion to compel arbitration is 
"embedded" in a substantive suit pending before that court, the district 
court's decision to compel arbitration of some or all of the claims before 
it is not considered to be final, and therefore not reviewable. 137 
135. Id. at 1254. 
136. 122 F.3d 1242 (9'h Cir. 1997). 
137. !d. at 1244 citing from Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9'h Cir. 
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The court stated that it was expressly following the Eighth Circuit 
opinion and the majority rule in the United States. The majority opinion 
concluded with the words: "We stress again that we are not precluding re-
view of the district court's order compelling arbitration; we are merely 
postponing it until the arbitration proceeding has run its course. " 138 
Under this approach, it would appear that the court is trying to avoid 
deciding the arbitration issue in a bifurcated approach. Rather, it is hoping 
for one decision which may close the entire case. If the person contesting 
the arbitration wins the arbitration this person will not appeal. It is an at-
tempt at judicial economy which may not always succeed. 
HH. Third-party Beneficiaries of a Promissory Note May Be Deprived of 
Any Benefits under the Note by an Arbitration Award Even Though They 
Were Not Parties to the Arbitration Proceedings. 
In Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v. Drago Daic Interests, Inc., u9 
Nauru purchased land from Daic and M-666 for $5 million in cash and $8 
million in a purchase money promissory note secured by a deed of trust on 
the land. The note provided it would be paid from profits earned in the 
development and sale of a large home subdivision, and if there were no 
profits there would not be any recourse against Nauru. Nauru contracted 
with Drago for the land's development. The development contract pro-
vided for arbitration of disputes. Disputes arose between Naura and Drago, 
and the arbitration panel by a 2 to I vote ruled in favor of Nauru. 
In addition, the arbitration panel decided that Nauru was not liable to 
the payees of the promissory note because the breach by Drago resulted in 
no profits and the payment condition in the note was, therefore, not satis-
fied. The two payees of the note were not parties to the arbitration pro-
ceedings. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed that the third-party beneficiaries of the purchase money promissory 
1994) Accord In re Pisgah Contractors Inc .. 117 F. 3d 133 (4"' Cir. 1997); Errnencgildo Zegna Corp. 
v. ?.egna, 133 F.3d 177 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
138 See supra note 3 at 1244. This analysis has been followed by the majority of courts 
examining the issue of interlocutory appeals under section 16. See. q;., F.C. Schaffer & Assocs .. 
Inc. v. Demech Contractors, Ltd., 101 F.3d 40, 42-3 (5'" Cir. 1996) (dismissing appeal from district 
court's order compelling arbitration for lack of jurisdiction); American Cas. Co. of Reading, 
Pennsylvania v. L-J, Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 135-39 (4'" Cir. 1994) (holding that order staying litigation 
pending arbitration of embedded claims was nonappealable); Filanto, SP.A v. Chilewich Int'l Corp .. 
984 F.2d 58, 60 (2nd. Cir. 1993). But see Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am .. 72 F.3d 793. 797 
(I O"' Cir. 1995) (holding that dismissal as a result of order to compel arbitration presents an 
appealable final decision); Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1276 (6"' Cir. 1990) (affinning 
the district court's dismissal of the complaint in deference to arbitration). 
139. 138 F.3d 160 (5'" Cir. 1998). 
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note would be bound by the award, even though they were not formal par-
ties to the arbitration. Judge Higginbotham wrote, 140 
Their arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, the provisions of 
both the Development Agreement and the Promissory Note reveal that 
the two documents are inextricably intertwined. The first paragraph in 
the Promissory Note states in relevant part: 
The terms of the Earnest Money Contract and the Development 
Agreement are hereby incorporated into this Note as if fully set forth in 
this Note. 
Not only does it fully incorporate by reference the Development 
Agreement, the Promissory Note is explicitly referenced throughout the 
Development Agreement. 
The arbitration clause in the Development Agreement provides: 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with or 
relating to this Agreement or any breach or alleged breach hereof, shall, 
upon the request of any party involved, be submitted to and settled by 
arbitration in Houston, Texas pursuant to the rules then in effect of the 
American Arbitration Association. 
As this court has noted, "[w]hen parties include such a broad arbi-
tration clause, they intend the clause to reach all aspects of the relation-
ship." Here, Nauru's demand for arbitration states that DDI's failure to 
perform pursuant to the Development Agreement affects its liability on 
the Promissory Note. Thus, DDI knew that Nauru's liability on the 
Promissory Note was indeed an issue before the arbitration panel. 
Further, by virtue of the two agreements, the Development Agree-
ment had to be performed without material breach by DDI in order for 
the noteholders to be paid. Nauru's duty to make payment pursuant to 
the Promissory Note was a "conditional obligation," and Nauru had 
"certain set-off rights" against its obligation to pay which were specified 
in the Development Agreement. By the very terms of the Promissory 
Note, any material breach of the Development Agreement by DDI would 
put payment on this Note at risk. The evidence on record shows that Mr. 
Drago Daic wanted DDI to be the developer of Bentwood pursuant to 
the Development Agreement and the Promissory Note were intimately 
related to one another, and the district court did not err in finding that 
the arbitration panel had the authority to rule on Nauru's liability on the 
Promissory Note since it was intimately "related to" the Development 
Agreement. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the dispute over DDI's perfor-
mance of the Development Agreement. 141 
Judge Higgenbotham further noted that "[a]s effective third-party ben-
eficiaries, the noteholders may be precluded from litigating the issue of 
140. /d. at 165. 
141. /d. at 164-66 (citations omitted). 
348 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
breach of the Development Agreement in any subsequent proceeding and 
may be bound by the panel's finding of non-liability on Nauru's part for 
the Promissory Note. 142 
In light of the holding in this case, third-party beneficiary clients (and 
their lawyers) ought to consider asking for leave to intervene in arbitration 
proceedings (and litigation) in order to assert their rights whenever there is 
doubt that the promissor or promissee is insufficiently represented. If a per-
son's rights are going to be adversely affected, he or she should have the 
opportunity to defend his or her rights. 
!1. Under a Broad Arbitration Clause Which States That, "I A]ll Contro-
versies and Claims Arising out of or Relating to this Agreement, Shall Be 
Settled by Arbitration," the Arbitration Panel Shall Have Jurisdiction to 
Determine Whether the Contract Was Fraudulently Induced, Even When 
the Contract Provides for the Application of Ohio Law Which Forbids 
this Kind of Determination by Arbitrators. 
In Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 143 two corporations entered 
into a contract calling for the production of a chemical which the seller 
agreed to sell to the buyer. The contract provided that "[a]ll controversies 
and claims arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be settled by 
arbitration." 144 
The contract also provided that the Ohio law would control. The par-
ties disagreed with each other, and arbitration was called for by one of the 
parties. The other party asserted that it was fraudulently induced to enter 
into the contract. The party asserting fraud claimed that the arbitrators did 
not have the power to determine whether fraud induced the party to enter 
into the contract, because Ohio law governed the contract and in Ohio, 
arbitrators do not have jurisdiction to decide fraudulent inducement cases. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the adoption of Ohio law 
simply governed the relationship between the parties, but that the arbitra-
tion clause governed any arbitration proceedings. The court noted that 
Ferro (the complaining party) drafted the broad arbitration clause, and 
there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended that Ohio 
law would control the determination of fraudulent inducement. 145 
JJ. The United States Supreme Court Has Held That Non-members of a 
Labor Union Who Are Forced to Pay Union Dues under an "Agencv 
142. !d. at 166. 
143. 142 F.3d 926 (6th Cir 1998) 
144. /d. 
145. !d. 
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Shop Agreement" and Who Object to the Non-labor Use of a Portion of 
Their Dues, Are Not Compelled to Undergo Arbitration to Determine the 
Amount of the Dues Unless They Consent to Arbitration. 
In Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. Miller, 146 pilots of Delta Airlines, who 
were non-members of the Airlines Pilots Association Union, protested 
about the partial use of their "Agency Shop Agreement" dues for non-la-
bor purposes. The Airline Pilots Union sought arbitration to determine the 
amount to be set aside and the amount returned to the non-member pilots, 
but the non-member pilots sought court adjudication. The federal district 
court upheld the arbitration, but the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed. The United States Supreme Court held that 
submission to arbitration is normally a matter of contractual consent by the 
affected parties, and the non-members of the ALPA Union did not contrac-
tually consent to arbitration and are entitled to hearings in the federal 
courts. In effect, the court held that even though the non-members of the 
union had to pay a portion of their wages as union dues, they were not 
bound by the arbitration clause agreed to by the Union. 
Dissenting Justices Breyer and Stevens expressed the view that the 
non-members should submit to non-binding arbitration. It is submitted that 
the addition of a non-binding additional step would not add to the efficient 
determination of the ultimate question. It would simply add additional de-
lay and expense to the process. 
It is submitted that the views expressed by Justice Ginsburg enunciate 
the correct view that arbitration is based primarily upon contractual con-
sent and non-contracting parties should not be forced to submit to arbitra-
tion. The dissenting view seems based upon some notion of judicial conve-
nience which ignores the contractual aspect. 
One may wonder as to what effect the failure of the hotel to object as 
to the "restoration issue" had on the majority of the court as to the ultimate 
decision in this case? 
KK. The Franchisee and the Franchisor in Two Franchise Contracts 
May Be Bound to Arbitrate Their Differences under Franchise Contract 
Number One (Which Had No Arbitration Clause) When Franchise Con-
tract Number Two Had a Broad Arbitration Clause. 
In Cara 's Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 147 Mr. and Mrs. Gib-
son contracted (Contract 1) for a franchise from Hallmark Cards to operate 
a Hallmark greeting card store. The contract was silent as to arbitration. 
146 118 S.Ct. 1761 (1998) 
147. 140 F.3d '\66 (4'" Cir. 1998) 
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Subsequently, the parties entered into a second contract (Contract 2) which 
provided for a new store in a different location. The second contract pro-
vided: 
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agree-
ment, or the breach thereof, or any aspects of the relationship between 
Hallmark and Retailer, or the termination thereof, shall be settled by 
binding arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act in accor-
dance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association, and judgment upon the award may be entered in any 
court having jurisdiction thereof. 148 
The parties had some serious differences under Contract One, and the 
Gibson's filed suit in the state court, and Hallmark removed the case to the 
federal district court and requested the court to order arbitration. The dis-
trict court held: 
that matters regarding Store I were governed only by Contract I and that 
matters regarding Store II were governed only by Contract II, the district 
court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that 
"[b ]ecause Contract I does not contain an arbitration clause, this matter 
regarding Store I is not subject to arbitration." The district court held 
that the arbitration clause in Contract II did not modify the relationship 
created by Contract I because it believed that the first contract's merger 
clause required any modification to be "in writing with a specific refer-
ence to Store I." It further held that the arbitration clause in Contract II 
did not apply directly to matters regarding Store I because "the 
boilerplate contract [II], in its introduction, specifically states that the 
contract is in reference to Store II," and because the merger clause in 
Contract II uses the singular term "a Hallmark account" instead of a plu-
ral term such as "accounts," thus "specifically limit[ing] its scope to 
Store 11.'' 149 
For some inexplicable reason, the district court did not expressly ana-
lyze the language in the broad arbitration clause in Contract Number 2. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the broad arbitration 
clause in Contract Number 2 did govern disputes under Contract Number 
1. The court then noted that even if the arbitration clause had been ambig-
uous in its scope, there was still the strong federal policy encouraging 
arbitrability under the Federal Arbitration Act and this would compel the 
same result. 150 
148. !d. at 568. 
149. ld 
150. !d. 
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This case suggests that when parties contemplate signing successive 
contracts they should employ legal counsel who will scrutinize the rela-
tionship between the contracts to ascertain how they interrelate. But here, 
even an experienced federal district court judge failed to perceive the inter-
relationship. 
LL. According to the Full Panel of One Circuit Court, an Arbitrator Has 
the Power to Order an Employer to Re-establish Employment Positions 
of Workers and to Order the Employer to Hire New Employees to Fill 
These Re-established Positions, Even Though the Old Employees Have 
Refused to Return to Work. 
In Madison Hotel v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees of Local 25, 151 a 
hotel company abolished the "bus boy" positions, discharged the "bus 
boys," and assigned their duties to others. The union brought arbitration 
proceedings, and the arbitrator ruled that the hotel must re-establish these 
positions. The district court disagreed with the arbitrator. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court, 
and then an en bane Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator had the 
power to order the hotel to re-establish the positions and to order the hotel 
to hire employees to fill these positions. 
It should be noted that a concurring opinion pointed out that the hotel 
failed to object to the restoration issue, and it thereby waived its right to 
object to the consideration of this issue by the arbitrator. 152 
MM. A Buyer of Goods May Be Subject to an Arbitration Clause Even 
When it May Not Have Actual Notice, (As Contrasted with Constructive 
Notice) of an Arbitration Clause in Shipping Documents. 
In Steel Warehouse Co. v. Abalone Shipping Ltd., 153 a buyer in the 
United States contracted to buy steel coils from an English seller. The coils 
were manufactured in Bulgaria and were shipped to the United States un-
der a charter party arrangement. The coils were damaged by seawater in 
transit, and the buyer filed suit in a federal district court. The seller and 
affiliated shipping companies sought arbitration because the tem1s of the 
charter party, which were incorporated by reference into the bill of lading, 
stated that, "all disputes from time to time arising out of this contract 
shall ... be referred to final arbitration in London." 154 The court held that 
151. 144 F3d 855 (0 C. Cir 1998) 
152. /d. 
153. 141 F3d 234 (5'h Cir. 1998) 
154. /d. at 238. 
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the buyer had constructive notice of this arbitration clause because it was 
found to be commonly used in bills of lading. As the court put it: 
Constructive notice can be defined, crudely, as a rule in which "if 
you should have known something, you'll be held responsible for what 
you should have known." In this situation, Steel Warehouse was a so-
phisticated party, and one of its own agents testified that arbitration 
clauses of the type at issue arc standard operating procedure in this line 
of business. Also, the bill of lading at issue was on a common, interna-
tionally recognized form of bill of lading called a "Congen Bill." In 
other words, if the charter party clause was properly incorporated, given 
the facts before us, Steel Warehouse should have known what was 
around the corner, given the totality of the circumstances. Whether one 
styles this as an issue of constructive notice or incorporation alone, the 
analysis basically turns on incorporation. 
The key point, then, is whether we believe the charter party was 
properly incorporated. We hold that it was. The relevant part of the bill 
of Jading (which was the same in both of the bills of lading taken before 
the district court) stated: 
Freight Payable as per CHARTER-PARTY dated 2 I OCTO-
BER I 994 ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH 
ARE INCOR-PORATED IN THIS B!L. 
A plain language reading of this clause makes it clear that "THIS BIL 
[bill of lading]" incorporates the terms of conditions of the charter party, 
dated October 21, 1994, including, presumably, its (industry standard) 
arbitration clause. While it would have been preferable for this clause in 
the bill of lading to have been more specific and detailed, it passes mus-
ter, given the facts of this case. Also, precedent allows for quite a bit of 
leeway in the drafting of such clauses, and does not require a punctilious 
degree of specificity. 155 
The court emphasized that the buyer was a "sophisticated party" and 
the fact that one of its agents had knowledge of this practice to incorporate 
by reference, and was bound by an arbitration clause by some kind of con-
structive notice. The danger in this case is that an unwary court might ap-
ply this rationale in a case with a less sophisticated party such as an entry 
level merchant or, heaven forbid, a consumer. As long as the tiger is con-
fined to its cage, there is no danger. 
155. /d. at 237 (citations omilted). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As the title indicates, this article has been an analysis of miscellaneous 
federal cases dealing with judicial "interference" in the arbitration process. 
If there is a common thread running through the cases, it is that the federal 
courts (as well as some state courts) are too anxious to hear appeals from 
the arbitral awards with the consequent inflation of legal fees and waste of 
time and labor. 
It is suggested that the FAA should be amended to provide that arbi-
trators issue their awards in a "preliminary draft" with the parties given 
leave to ask for a single rehearing or re-evaluation of the preliminary 
award (by the arbitrator). 
Further, it is suggested that the FAA should provide that the parties in 
commercial arbitration may agree, in advance, that the final award shall be 
deemed final and non-appealable in accordance with the relatively new 
English Arbitration Act. 
The author has no illusions that these changes in the law would consti-
tute a panacea for judicial tinkering with the arbitration process, but it 
might be two steps out of the present morass. 
